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Abstract      
The goal of this thesis is to examine if, and to what extent, stock prices and trading volumes are 
affected by inclusions (exclusions) to (from) the following Nordic indices: OMX Helsinki 25, OMX 
Stockholm 30, OMX Copenhagen 25, and OMX Copenhagen 20. If observable effects are found, the 
research aims to examine whether the abnormal price and volume movements are temporary, or if 
they last over a longer period and whether they are symmetric between inclusions and exclusions. 
Finally, the thesis will discuss the hypotheses that could explain the findings.  
 
To answer the research questions, relevant empirical evidence and suggested hypotheses are shortly 
compared and discussed. In addition, quantitative research is conducted using the event study 
methodology. The final sample of the study consists of 80 index inclusion and exclusion events in the 
Nordic indices between January 2009 and January 2020. The event study is implemented to determine 
whether abnormal returns or abnormal trading volumes occur around the events. Finally, conclusions 
are made. 
 
The results of the thesis suggest that the index effect is evident in the Nordic indices (OMXH25, 
OMXS30, OMXC25, & OMXC20). However, the effect is rather negligible since no distinct 
abnormal return patterns are discovered around the index revision events, and only abnormal returns 
on individual days around the events are measured. In the short-term, temporary price and trading 
volume occurrences are found, suggesting heavy trading by index funds and investors especially 
before the changes become effective. Furthermore, the volume effects are found to be somewhat 
permanent and symmetric between included and excluded stocks indicating improved (impaired) 
liquidity for stocks that are included (excluded) to (from) the Nordic indices. Moreover, pre-
announcement trading volume increase for index additions is observed, which can be explained with 
anticipatory trading or selection criteria hypothesis. Despite the long-term abnormal trading volume 
occurrence, no long-term return effects are found. This gives support to the efficient market 
hypothesis, since stock prices are relatively unaffected by the significantly abnormal trading volumes. 
The findings of the thesis support the price pressure and liquidity hypotheses. Additionally, the 
findings do not reject the selection criteria hypothesis, which may explain a part of the results. 
 
While most of the literature on the index effect is conducted on the S&P 500 or other major indices, 
this thesis provides new insights into the phenomenon by studying the effects in the Nordic indices.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Stock market indices are occasionally revised in accordance with the methodology that 
the index applies. These revisions lead to occasional deletions of one or more 
participant companies from the index and consequently to inclusions of a new 
company or companies to the index. Typically, the index methodology that is applied 
for deciding index changes is based on certain factors that are public information. 
Therefore, the changes are often considered as events that do not provide any new 
information to the market participants. The semi-strong form of efficient market 
hypothesis suggests that stock prices in efficient markets should reflect all publicly 
available information and adjust immediately to reflect any new information (Fama, 
1970). Therefore, stock prices should not be affected by these index composition 
changes, as stated by the efficient market hypothesis.  
Most of the stock market indices are tracked by index funds that are constructed to 
replicate the performance of a certain market index as closely as possible. When 
changes are made in the composition of the index, index funds buy (sell) the included 
(excluded) stocks to track the index precisely, creating high demand (supply) for these 
stocks. Contradictory with the efficient market hypothesis, researchers have 
discovered that in addition to this increased demand and supply, a share price 
movement occurs due to the index inclusions and exclusions. This price movement 
caused by index composition changes is an anomaly and has been termed the index 
effect.  
Over the past decades, an abundance of research has been conducted on whether index 
inclusions or exclusions affect stock prices and trading volumes. Earlier studies (see 
e.g. Chen, Noronha & Singal, 2004; Harris & Gurel, 1986; Kappou, Brooks & Ward, 
2010; Lynch & Mendenhall, 1997; Shleifer, 1986) mainly focus on the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index. Most of these studies claim that companies that were included 
to the S&P 500 index show significant positive share price effect at the time of the 
inclusion, while those being removed exhibit negative share price movement. 
However, some of the more recent studies argue that this index effect might have 
changed or diminished over the years (see e.g. Kappou, 2018; Kim, Li & Perry, 2017; 
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Ming-Pey & Ahmad, 2019). Therefore, the current situation regarding the index effect 
and its existence is rather puzzling.  
Past studies have suggested different theories and explanations underlying the 
observed price and trading volume effects. The proposed theories seem to vary, as 
some of them are demand-based and others information-based. Demand-based 
theories include downward-sloped demand curve and price pressure hypotheses, 
whereas information-based theories include awareness, information, liquidity and 
selection criteria hypotheses. These hypotheses are further reviewed in later sections.  
As most of the literature on the index effect is conducted on the S&P 500 or other 
major indices, this thesis provides new insights into the phenomenon by studying the 
effects in the Nordic indices, more specifically in the OMX Helsinki 25 (OMXH25), 
OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS30), OMX Copenhagen 25 (OMXC25), and OMX 
Copenhagen 20 (OMXC20)1 indices. The Nordic indices provide an information free 
setting to study the index effect. This information free setting results from the selection 
criteria that are employed in the Nordic indices for index composition changes, as the 
criteria contains only market capitalization and trading volume. Because the index 
change decisions are made based on these publicly available criteria, index inclusions 
and exclusions in the Nordic indices should not provide any new information to the 
market participants. For many other indices, including the S&P 500 index, the criterion 
is nonspecific and not explicitly based on public information. From the efficient 
market hypothesis point of view, it is relevant to assess the existence of the index effect 
under information free conditions. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the index effect exists in four Nordic 
indices: OMXH25, OMXS30, OMXC25, and OMXC20. More specifically, stock 
price and trading volume movements are investigated around announcement date of 
an index composition changes (the announcement date) and around the date when 
                                                 
1 OMX Copenhagen 25 replaced OMX Copenhagen 20 on December 18th, 2017 as the leading index 
for Nasdaq Copenhagen. Therefore, both two Danish indices are under consideration in this thesis. 
OMX Iceland 10 is not considered in this thesis due to lack of index constitution change events. The 
Norwegian indices are not considered in this thesis due to minor differences in selection criterion.  
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composition changes come into effect (the effective date). If there are some observable 
effects, the research aims to assess whether the abnormal price and volume movements 
are temporary, or if they last over a longer period. Additionally, the thesis aims to 
examine whether these movements are symmetric between index inclusions and 
exclusions. Moreover, the thesis will assess what hypotheses could explain the 
findings. The research questions are as follows:  
1) Is there an index effect on the stocks included or excluded from the OMXH25, 
OMXS30, OMXC25, and OMXC20 indices?  
2) If an index effect is found, are the abnormal price and volume movements 
temporary or long-standing?  
3) Are the effects symmetric between index inclusions and exclusions?  
4) What hypotheses could explain the results? 
To answer the research questions, quantitative research is conducted using the event 
study methodology. The event study is commonly applied method to measure the 
impact of a specific event on the stock price or trading volume of a company. The final 
sample for the study consists of 80 index inclusion and exclusion events in the Nordic 
indices between January 2009 and January 2020. The announcement of an index 
change, and the change becoming effective, are studied separately. The event study is 
implemented to determine whether abnormal returns or abnormal trading volumes 
occur around the events. Abnormal return (abnormal volume) is the difference of the 
actual asset return (volume) and the predicted asset return (volume). 
The results of the thesis suggest that the index effect is evident in the Nordic indices 
(OMXH25, OMXS30, OMXC25, & OMXC20). However, the effect is rather 
negligible since no distinct abnormal return patterns are discovered around the index 
revision events and only abnormal returns on individual days around the events are 
measured. In the short-term, temporary price and trading volume occurrences are 
found, suggesting heavy trading by index funds and investors especially before the 
changes come into effect. Furthermore, the volume effects are found to be somewhat 
permanent and symmetric between included and excluded stocks indicating improved 
(impaired) liquidity for stocks that are included (excluded) to (from) the Nordic 
indices. Moreover, pre-announcement trading volume increase for index additions is 
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observed, which can be explained by anticipatory trading or selection criteria 
hypothesis. Despite the long-term abnormal trading volume occurrence, no long-term 
return effects are found. This gives support to the efficient market hypothesis, since 
stock prices are relatively unaffected by the significantly abnormal trading volumes. 
The findings of the thesis support the price pressure and liquidity hypotheses. 
Additionally, the findings do not reject the selection criteria hypothesis, which may 
explain a part of the results. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two gives a description of the 
Nordic indices and selection criterion used for revisions of the index. The relation 
between the efficient market theorem and the index effect is introduced in chapter 
three. Chapter four discusses suggested hypotheses for the index effect and gives an 
overview of empirical evidence on relevant previous literature. Empirical 
methodology applied in the thesis is introduced in chapter five, while chapter six shows 
and discusses the findings. Chapter seven concludes the thesis (and its findings).  
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2 DESCRIPTION OF THE NORDIC INDICES 
In October 2006, the Danish, Finnish, and Swedish stock exchanges were merged to 
form the Nordic stock exchange Nasdaq OMX Nordic Exchanges. Each country has 
its leading share index; OMX Helsinki 25 (OMXH25), OMX Stockholm 30 
(OMXS30), and OMX Copenhagen 25 (OMXC25). OMXC25 replaced OMX 
Copenhagen 20 (OMXC20) on December 2017 as the leading index for Nasdaq 
Copenhagen. Therefore, both Danish indices are under consideration in this thesis. The 
constituents of these leading share indices include the largest and most actively traded 
stocks on Nasdaq Helsinki, Nasdaq Stockholm, and Nasdaq Copenhagen. The indices 
are market weighted price indices and have the same selection criteria of market 
capitalization and trading volume.  
OMXH25, OMXS30, OMXC25, and OMXC20 indices select their constituents based 
on market capitalizations and trading volume. Information about the market 
capitalization and trading volume is publicly available and thus inclusions or 
exclusions from the Nordic indices should not give any new information to the public. 
The composition of the indices is revised twice a year. This selection criterion differs 
from most of the major indices, including the S&P 500 index.  
The S&P 500 index is designed to reflect the U.S. equity markets. It is a world-
renowned and widely followed index that contains 500 leading companies from the 
United States. Management of the S&P index is maintained by S&P Dow Jones Indices 
and index constituents are chosen and revised by Standard and Poor’s Index 
Committee. The Standard and Poor’s Index Committee, that is responsible for the 
index composition changes, utilizes nonspecific criterion for deciding the index 
changes. The criterion is not explicitly based on public information. Moreover, 
changes in the composition of the index are mainly caused by necessity to exit from 
one or more of the member companies through mergers, takeovers, restructuring, or 
bankruptcies, leaving only a few pure deletions. According to S&P Dow Jones Indices 
(2020), the candidate firms for new additions are carefully monitored, and criteria for 
inclusion are very strict. After the careful screening process replacement pool for 
potential candidates contains at least 10 firms. A firm is chosen from this pool 
whenever a new inclusion to the index is needed following the exclusion of a member 
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firm. The list of these inclusion candidates is kept secret by the index committee until 
the announcement date, and the candidate selection process itself is not publicly 
specified process. On the report of S&P Dow Jones Indices (2020), some of the criteria 
includes market capitalization, profitability, float and liquidity requirements, and 
being a U.S. business. However, companies that are a part of S&P Mid Cap 400, and 
S&P Small Cap 600 could get included with fewer restrictions. Furthermore, some 
companies simply cannot get included, for example if the company’s structure is too 
complex, or if the company owns multiple types of shares. The firms must get the 
approval of the index committee to get into the S&P 500, making it more of an active 
index than most other indices that simply use mechanical rules to pick their 
constituents.  
For these reasons, one could argue that it is more difficult for investors to predict 
changes to the S&P 500 index compared to the Nordic indices examined in this study. 
Petajisto (2008) posits that higher transparency of the index selection rules (less 
asymmetric information) is related to a lesser extent of the index effects, as the index 
composition changes can be predicted by market participants. Thus, the Nordic indices 
offer an interesting setup for studying the index effect that differs from e.g. the S&P 
500 index. Moreover, the S&P 500 index is rather unsuitable for studying index 
deletion effects, as it contains only few pure deletions. In the Nordics, the deletions as 
well as the additions are usually not based on corporate events, making the effects 
between the two types of events (deletions and additions) comparable. Furthermore, 
the period between the index change announcement date and the effective date (when 
the change takes place) is longer than in other major indices. In the Nordic indices, 
this time-period is approximately two weeks, whereas in other major indices it is only 
around one week. This enables to consider the announcement day and effective day 
effects separately. Therefore, it seems important to study the index effect in the Nordic 
stock markets more closely.  
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3 EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND THE INDEX EFFECT 
3.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
Fama (1970) introduced the widely discussed theory called efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH). There are three variations of the efficient market hypothesis – the weak, semi-
strong, and strong forms. These variations describe three different assumed levels of 
market efficiency. 
The weak form of efficient market hypothesis implies that future stock prices cannot 
be predicted based on past stock prices. Therefore, as claimed by the weak form, 
information incorporated in the past stock prices (e.g. dividends, trading volumes) are 
reflected or priced in the current stock prices. The weak form of efficient market 
hypothesis makes technical analysis useless, as it is based on historical price 
movements. 
The semi-strong form suggests that one cannot predict future stock price movements 
by using information that is available for everyone because all public information is 
already priced in the current stock price. Therefore, investors that are aware of any 
publicly known information cannot make profits with it, because the information has 
already been reflected in the stock price. Public information does not only include past 
stock prices, but also data reported by the company, for example, in form of financial 
statements as well as earnings, dividend, and other corporate announcements. The 
public information does not have to be financial information, as it could also be 
something else relevant for the company and its business, such as changes in the 
company’s market conditions, competitors’ outlook, or consumer behavior. Notably 
the semi-strong form incorporates weak form efficiency, since all historical price data 
is public information.  
The strong form efficiency states that current stock prices reflect all existing 
information, both public, and unpublished inside information. The idea behind the 
strong form efficiency is that even if one has inside information and could legally trade 
based upon it, one could not profit from it as current stock prices already reflect all the 
information. Strong form of market efficiency contains the weak and semi-strong 
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forms. However, it must be noted that Fama (1970) concludes that the strong form is 
not expected to be an exact description of reality and is not valid in real world.  
3.2 Market efficiency and the index effect 
The index effect can be defined as the price movement that occurs when a stock is 
included or excluded from an index. This contradicts with the efficient market 
hypothesis. Moreover, stock’s fundamental value is determined by the expected future 
cash flows that are discounted by the cost of capital. The cost of capital should express 
a firm’s systematic risk. Based on the semi-strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis, neither index inclusion or exclusion, or changes in a stock’s supply or 
demand should affect the stock price because no new information that could affect the 
firm’s fundamental value is revealed (Fama, 1970). In other words, as stated by the 
semi-strong form, new information about a firm’s fundamental value should be 
reflected in a stock price immediately. Instead, for example, changes in a stock’s 
supply or demand should not be reflected, as changes in those do not provide new 
information.  
Nonetheless, Scholes (1972) argues that stock prices are affected by high volumes. It 
is widely accepted that passive index funds, who track returns of a specific index, are 
behind the high trading volumes around index change events. Shleifer (1986) 
demonstrates that passive index funds have increased their ownership of the S&P 500 
between 1975 and 1983 from 0.5% to 3.1%. Since then, the index funds have become 
extremely popular, and during the last decades there has been a clear shift from actively 
managed funds to passive index funds (Morningstar, 2019). When these index funds 
track a certain index, their investment decisions are based on the necessary portfolio 
adjustments that are conducted whenever changes in the benchmark index occur. They 
aim to minimize the tracking error that potentially arises between the fund and the 
benchmark index. Tracking error is the difference between an index fund portfolio’s 
returns and the benchmark index’s returns that it was meant to mimic. Therefore, funds 
that focus purely on index tracking must buy (sell) stocks that are included (excluded) 
to (from) the index. As a result, index trackers ensure that demand will increase for 
included stocks and supply for excluded stocks. This enormous demand could cause 
pressure on the included or excluded stock’s price, resulting in a price shift (Scholes, 
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1972). From the efficient market hypothesis’ point of view, it is essential to evaluate 
whether these probable trading volume occurrences around the index change events 
affect stock prices. 
In general, anomalies relate to deviations from the common rule or what is seen as 
normal. In a way, market anomalies are distortions that contradict the efficient market 
hypothesis. Thereby, occurrence of market anomalies results in deviations from the 
efficient market theory and generates opportunities to earn abnormal returns. Thus, the 
index effect is an anomaly that contradicts the efficient market hypothesis. From the 
semi strong form of efficient market hypothesis’ point of view, this anomaly can be 
investigated by studying potential stock price reactions and the speed of stock prices 
reacting to index inclusions or exclusions. If the stock price reactions to index changes 
were rational or provided new information, the price should find its new equilibrium 
value immediately after the inclusion or exclusion announcement, in efficient market 
conditions.  
The Nordic indices (OMXH25, OMXS30, OMXC25, and OMXC20) consider only 
market capitalization and trading volume when new index inclusions and exclusions 
are determined. The information about market capitalization and trading volume is 
publicly available and thus inclusions or exclusions from the Nordic indices should 
not give any new information to investors, especially concerning stock’s fundamental 
value. S&P 500 has an Index Committee that identifies a pool of eligible candidates 
based on firm-specific qualities that are not nonspecific and based explicitly on public 
information. The committee has reported that it selects financially healthy and strong 
candidates to avoid index turnover, referring to the rate at which firms leave the index 
and are replaced. One could argue that this kind of positive report from S&P regarding 
the selected stocks, combined with the information asymmetry about the selection 
process, could be considered as new information to investors. Some claim that this is 
the reason why index inclusion announcements might be considered as good news 
about the included company in the S&P 500 index (e.g. Jain, 1987). In the Nordic 
indices, there should not exist similar information asymmetry issues regarding index 
composition change announcements. Therefore, Nordic indices offer an interesting 
environment to study the index effect as a phenomenon from the semi-strong efficient 
market hypothesis’ point of view.  
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4 EXISTING HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
As will be discussed later, a majority of the literature reports significant price and 
volume effects related to the index changes. Most of the empirical evidence suggest 
positive (negative) price effects related to index addition (deletion) events. Abnormal 
trading volume occurring around the events is widely reported. Yet, theories and 
explanations underlying these effects are controversial. Several theories and possible 
explanations for the effects have been proposed and discussed in the literature. The 
suggested theories seem to vary, with some of them being demand-based and others 
information-based. Additionally, the theories seem to argue whether the effects are 
temporary or permanent and whether they are symmetric between additions and 
deletions or not. The suggested hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive and 
may be even complementary. Thus, focusing on reviewing all the relevant hypotheses 
in this thesis seems necessary. In the next subsections, the suggested hypotheses are 
first reviewed and shortly discussed and then the empirical evidence is reviewed.   
4.1 Suggested hypotheses for the index effect 
4.1.1 Downward-sloped demand curve hypothesis 
The downward-sloped demand curve hypothesis suggests that stocks have a long-term 
downward sloping demand curve and no perfect substitutes. If there were perfect 
substitutes between stocks, their demand curves should be horizontal because there 
would be arbitrage opportunities between them (Scholes, 1972). On the contrary, if 
stocks do not have perfect substitutes their demand curves should be downward 
sloping because the arbitrage opportunities are then limited. For example, stock X 
would be the perfect substitute for stock Y, if the demand for the other stock increases 
when the price of the other increases and vice versa. Because of this, the downward-
sloped demand curve hypothesis is often referred to as the imperfect substitute 
hypothesis. Practically, the hypothesis forecasts temporary excess demand and trading 
volume after the index change, which will eventually be eliminated by stock prices 
reaching a new equilibrium value (Kappou, Brooks & Ward, 2008). According to the 
hypothesis, increase (decrease) in the stock price upon an index inclusion (exclusion) 
must occur as the excess demand caused by the event must be fulfilled by the stock 
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price reaching a new equilibrium value, in the absence of perfect substitutes or other 
explanations. Therefore, the excess demand shifts the downward-sloping demand 
curve outwards. The hypothesis suggests that stock price reactions to index inclusions 
and exclusions should be symmetric and permanent. 
Shleifer (1986) recognizes that stock price reactions followed by index additions or 
deletions are consistent with stocks retaining downward-sloping demand curves. His 
results suggest a large increase in trading volumes around the inclusions indicating a 
shift in demand that is most likely due to index funds rebalancing their portfolios. 
Furthermore, Shleifer reports a permanent rise in the stock prices following index 
inclusions, which he argues to be positively related to increases in demand. Lynch and 
Mendenhall (1997) indicate similar conclusions and claim the demand curves for 
stocks to be downward-sloping in the long-term. They find weakly positive permanent 
price effects for index inclusions and significantly negative permanent effects for 
exclusions. Findings of Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) further support the 
downward-sloped demand curve hypothesis, as the authors argue that stocks do not 
have perfect substitutes. Moreover, Bechmann (2004) reports similar long-run effects 
after index changes and posits that the effects are best explained by the downward-
sloped demand curve hypothesis or the liquidity hypothesis that will be assessed later.  
4.1.2 Price pressure hypothesis 
The price pressure hypothesis, first proposed by Scholes (1972), suggests a downward-
sloped demand curve in the short term and a horizontal or fully elastic demand curve 
in the long term. As specified by the hypothesis, the strong demand resulting from 
index inclusion generates upward price pressure in the short term (downward sloped 
demand curve). This excess demand and price increase will drive some of the investors 
to sell the stock, which will satisfy the excess demand and the price pressure. As a 
result, the stock price reverts (horizontal demand curve). The effect is contrary to index 
exclusions, as the exclusions will face excess supply and downward price pressure. 
(Harris & Gurel, 1986.) The strong demand or supply around index changes has been 
widely recognized to be mainly caused by index funds that are required to rebalance 
their portfolios to keep their tracking error as low as possible.  
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Harris and Gurel (1986) were the first to study the price pressure hypothesis as a 
potential explanation of shifts to price and volume around index inclusion and 
exclusion events. They state that in the S&P 500 index, inclusions and exclusions 
create shifts in demand for the stocks and report immediate price increase for included 
stocks. Full price reversal occurs after the short-term abnormal returns. Moreover, 
Harris and Gurel argue that index change events do not offer any new information to 
the public (the prices would not revert if new information was announced); therefore, 
the price effects are explained by excess demand and supply. They suggest that 
demand curves are downward-sloped in the short term and horizontal in the long term.  
Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) report evidence (based on their data after the S&P 
policy change in October 1989, which will be further discussed later) that supports the 
price pressure hypothesis. They find significantly positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement day of index inclusion and positive cumulative abnormal returns from 
the announcement date to one week forward until the effective date. However, 
following the effective date of index inclusions, significantly negative abnormal 
returns are reported. This effect is inverted for exclusions. The study claims heavy 
index fund trading to be the reason for these temporary stock price reactions around 
the index inclusions and exclusions, supporting the price pressure hypothesis. Lynch 
and Mendenhall also agree with the arguments of Harris and Gurel (1986) claiming 
that the index changes seem to not provide any valuable information to investors. 
Additionally, Mase (2007) argues that the abnormal price pressure potentially explains 
the index effect. Moreover, he posits that stocks that have been nearly included 
(excluded) to (from) the FTSE 100 index have had abnormally large trading volumes 
prior the index composition change announcements, which implies that some traders 
are speculating with the announcements. Contrary to the price pressure hypothesis and 
heavy index fund trading, Jain (1987) discovers abnormal returns also for firms 
included to supplementary indices2 of S&P that are not tracked by index funds. While 
the price pressure hypothesis appears to offer a rational explanation for the short-term 
                                                 
2 According to Jain (1987) these indices covered about 40 firms that are not included in the S&P 500 at 
the end of 1983. These indices are not named, but are said to include gaming companies, Canadian oil 
and gas exploration companies, brokerage firms, investment firms and low-priced stocks.  
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effect it fails to explain the permanent abnormal returns that are reported by some 
studies (e.g. Chen et al., 2004; Shleifer, 1986; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002).  
4.1.3 Awareness hypothesis 
The investor awareness hypothesis states that when a firm is included to an index. the 
price response should be at least partly due to increased investor awareness of the 
existence of the firm. Chen et al. (2004) introduce investor awareness as a possible 
factor to explain the index effect. They find asymmetric responses to index inclusions 
and exclusions and explain these responses with differences in investors’ awareness 
levels. They propose that investor awareness raises for firms that are included in the 
S&P 500 index, whereas the decrease in awareness for excluded firms is lower. As a 
result, the price responses are asymmetric; included firms exhibit permanent price 
increase (because the investors are more aware of the firm as it now belongs to a 
recognized index and is followed more) and excluded firms exhibit no permanent 
negative price effects (because the investor awareness of the firm does not diminish 
easily following a deletion from an index).  
Chen et al. (2004) further explain why raised awareness increases the market value of 
a firm; 1) it improves the monitoring of the firm by investors, and the management is 
more efficient to satisfy the investors, 2) it enhances firm’s access to capital markets, 
3) it improves the liquidity of the firm’s stock, 4) it reduces information asymmetry 
related to the bid-ask spread, and 5) it lessens the shadow costs introduced by Merton 
(1987). Merton’s (1987) shadow cost, in his model of market segmentation, represents 
a situation where under incomplete information some investors are aware only of a 
subset of all existing stocks and invest only in those. This results in investors being 
insufficiently diversified and demanding a premium for the nonsystematic risk they 
face, which is the shadow cost. Being part of a well-known index makes more investors 
to become aware of a firm’s existence and results in more investors starting to invest 
in this stock. This causes the shadow cost of the stock to decrease which further 
decreases the required rate of return of the stock, making the stock price increase. 
Exclusion from index does not necessarily have symmetric effects as investors do not 
suddenly become unaware of the firm (Chen et al., 2004). 
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There are some studies supporting the awareness hypothesis. Chen and Lin (2018) 
examine the index effects by comparing newly S&P 500 included firms to their peers 
that are not listed in the index. They report findings that support the awareness 
hypothesis by suggesting that newly included firms experience better investor 
awareness, stock liquidity, and reduction in information asymmetry, all of which are 
features of investor awareness hypothesis. Furthermore, they find that index deletions 
do not have symmetric effects, which supports the findings of Chen et al. (2004). 
However, Chen and Lin (2018) also discover that newly added firms experience gains 
in market share and get some competitive advantage over their industry peers that are 
not listed in the S&P 500 index. Thus, they argue that index inclusion does not only 
raise investor awareness but also gives a competitive edge for the firm. On the 
contrary, Mase (2007) offers criticism to the hypothesis. He reports no significant 
differences between the return effects of first-time additions and additions that have 
already been in the index but have since been excluded and now are added there again. 
Therefore, Mase concludes that increased monitoring or higher state of investor 
awareness cannot explain the index effect in the FTSE 100 index. However, it must be 
considered that Mase studies the index effect in the FTSE index, while most of 
previous research examine the S&P 500. Thus, it is possible that the index where the 
firm is added or deleted might have something to do with the results.   
4.1.4 Information hypothesis 
Shleifer (1986) remarks that inclusion to the S&P 500 or other indices might provide 
some valuable information that could lead to abnormal returns. The information 
hypothesis, sometimes called the certification hypothesis, suggests that inclusion to 
(exclusion from) index indicates new positive (negative) information about the firm 
(Chen et al., 2004). Inclusion in a major index may also be taken as information about 
the firm’s position as a leader of its industry (Jain, 1987). One could argue that if index 
composition changes would provide new information to the market, the authorities that 
make decisions about the changes must have nonpublic information about firms and 
use it to make the decisions. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2004) mention that S&P’s 
index committee relies on publicly available information when making decisions 
regarding the index composition changes. However, analysis they perform on the 
inclusion candidates, in order to make these change decisions, could potentially 
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propose an excellence of the included firm’s quality or competitiveness over its 
industry peers. Notably, information hypothesis suggests symmetric price reactions for 
index additions and deletions.  
Jain (1987) and Dhillon and Johnson (1991) show findings of persistent stock price 
reactions to composition changes in the S&P 500 index and argue that index inclusions 
provide new positive information to the market about the firm. Moreover, Shleifer 
(1986) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) find that permanent stock price effects are 
related to index changes in the S&P 500. In addition to the downward-sloping demand 
curve and the awareness hypotheses, one explanation for such positive permanent 
effects, is the information content that the index change announcements could  
potentially provide. Nevertheless, the information content of the index changes has 
also been widely criticized in the literature (e.g. Harris & Gurel, 1986; Lynch & 
Mendenhall, 1997; Kappou, 2018). Furthermore, if index changes would provide 
valuable information, then the pricing effect should occur immediately on the 
announcement day, and no further price shift would occur after that, as the new 
information is fully priced in on the announcement day (Lynch & Mendenhall, 1997). 
4.1.5 Liquidity hypothesis 
The liquidity hypothesis is closely related to the information hypothesis. If index 
changes affect the included or excluded stocks’ liquidity, these events would have an 
effect on the prices of the stocks. If being included to index would alone increase a 
stock’s liquidity, then there should especially be a price increase (decrease) 
immediately after the announcement of addition (deletion) (Lynch & Mendenhall, 
1997). The inclusion of a stock to an index might result in better monitoring by analysts 
and professional investors. This would likely lead to a better public information 
available about the stock, further reflecting a decrease in a bid-ask spread (Shleifer, 
1986). The bid-ask spread refers to the amount by which the ask price exceeds the bid 
price for a stock in the market. Dhillon and Johnson (1991) add that more 
comprehensive monitoring may also lower agency costs. Moreover, improvement in 
liquidity of the stock included to an index results in a decline in the stock’s required 
rate of return, which should then increase the price of the stock (Shleifer, 1986). 
Exclusion from an index leads to opposite effects on the stock’s liquidity and price.  
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Studying the liquidity hypothesis often requires examining the market microstructure. 
Therefore, there are only a few robust studies conducted within the hypothesis. For 
instance, Hegde and McDermott (2003) study liquidity effects related to index 
composition changes in the S&P 500 index. Their findings suggest that when a firm is 
added (deleted) to (from) the index, there is a long-term increase (decrease) in 
liquidity. Hedge and McDermott discover that analyst monitoring changes a little for 
included firms, whereas institutional ownership increases significantly. Furthermore, 
they argue that liquidity is improved mainly because of a decrease in the transaction 
costs, rather than improvement in the amount of public information or monitoring of 
the stock. However, Hedge and McDermott (2003) conclude that despite the 
significant relationship between abnormal returns and better liquidity, liquidity is not 
the only factor to explain abnormal returns. Additionally, Bechmann (2004) reports 
long-run stock price effects in the KFX index and argues that the liquidity hypothesis 
may potentially explain some of the results. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2004) claim 
that indexing could also reduce the liquidity of included stocks. As mentioned by 
Hedge and McDermott (2003), inclusions to major indices seem to lead to increased 
ownership of institutional equity and index funds. As a result, the available float (the 
number of shares available for trading) should decrease, which might worsen the 
liquidity of a stock. Moreover, Beneish and Whaley (1996) find nonpermanent 
decrease in the quoted bid-ask spread after index inclusions, thus concluding that the 
liquidity hypothesis is not an appropriate explanation for abnormal returns.  
4.1.6 Selection criteria hypothesis 
Indices apply different criteria when making decisions on index composition changes. 
The selection criteria hypothesis states that stock price effects resulting from index 
composition changes are partly driven by these criteria for two major reasons. The first 
is related to selection bias, as many indices select their new additions based on criteria 
such as trading volume, market capitalization, or profitability. As a result, stocks that 
have experienced increase (decrease) in one or more of these variables prior to index 
change decision are likely to be added (deleted) to (from) the index (Bechmann, 2004). 
Therefore, it might be possible that a part of the index effect is actually caused by 
increase in the selection criteria (market capitalization specifically in this example), as 
it is likely that the added (deleted) stock was selected due to increasing (decreasing) 
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market value of the stock (Bechmann, 2004). Second, the hypothesis is also related to 
the efficient market hypothesis theorem. For example, Petajisto (2008) suggests that 
transparency in the index selection criteria might be related to the magnitude of the 
index effect. He claims that differences in the magnitude of the effects can arise 
depending on whether the selection rules are transparent and observable (no 
asymmetric information), or whether they are not freely observable or transparent 
(more asymmetric information). Furthermore, Petajisto shows that higher transparency 
of the index selection rules is related to a lesser extent of the index effects as the index 
composition changes could be predicted by market participants and vice versa.  
4.1.7 Summary of the hypotheses 
All hypotheses offer diverse explanations for the index effect. If index changes signal 
or cause changes in a firm’s future cash flows or cost of capital, then the information 
and/or liquidity hypotheses might explain the changes. If so, the price response to 
inclusions and exclusions should then be symmetric, as illustrated in Table 1. In that 
case, the effects would be rationally explained and not totally conflicted with the 
efficient market hypothesis. However, the awareness and selection criteria hypotheses 
are more information-based in a way that might conflict with the EMH, as according 
to them index changes do not provide new information about the firm’s future cash 
flows or cost of capital. Notably, all the information-based hypotheses suggest 
permanent price effects, and only the awareness hypothesis claims the effects for index 
inclusions and exclusions to be asymmetric. On the other hand, if index changes would 
be information-free events, the price pressure and downward-sloped demand curve 
hypotheses would possibly provide explanations. The two hypotheses differ in terms 
of effect longevity, as the price pressure hypothesis suggests temporary price 
deviations, and the downward-sloped demand curve hypothesis permanent price 
deviations. In both cases, the price effects should be symmetric for index inclusions 
and exclusions. 
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Table 1. Overview of characteristics of the hypotheses 
  
Downward-
sloped 
Demand 
Curve 
hypothesis 
Price 
Pressure 
hypothesis 
Awareness 
hypothesis 
Information 
hypothesis 
Liquidity 
hypothesis 
Selection 
criteria 
hypothesis 
Demand or 
information 
based 
Demand-
based 
Demand-
based 
Information-
based 
Information-
based 
Information-
based 
Information-
based 
Temporary 
or permanent 
effects 
Permanent  Temporary Permanent Permanent Permanent Permanent 
Symmetric or 
asymmetric 
effects 
Symmetric Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric 
As stated earlier, the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Scholars have offered 
empirical evidence that supports the different hypotheses, without agreeing on the 
most appropriate one. The reasons for such conflicting empirical findings and 
suggestions regarding the hypotheses are still unclear. 
4.2 Review of the empirical evidence 
Relevant studies are shortly examined to gain greater understanding of the index effect 
and its magnitude. Most of the empirical evidence focuses on the S&P 500 index and 
uses the standard event study methods. The earliest evidence stems from the 1970s 
when the index composition change practices in the S&P 500 index were different 
from the current. The market has also changed when it comes to the amount of index 
tracking funds’ ownership. In addition to the evolution of the market conditions over-
time, research made in the 21st century starts to question the magnitude and existence 
of the index effect. There has been a proliferation of research throughout the years, 
and the effect has been studied in a more diverse range of indices, markets, time frame, 
and data. Still, notable studies have not been conducted on the index effect in the 
Nordic indices.  
Shleifer (1986) was one of the first academics who reported significant positive 
abnormal returns for the stocks at the announcement of an inclusion to the S&P 500 
index. These positive returns exist for at least ten days after the inclusion event since 
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the index funds try to rebalance their portfolios over a longer period. He argues that 
the demand curve for stocks should therefore be downward-sloped. Hence, Shleifer is 
the first to suggest the downward-sloped demand curve hypothesis as a possible 
explanation for the index effect. In addition, he notes that the relative ownership of 
S&P500 by passive index funds started to increase after 1975 and reports that these 
funds have increased their ownership since then until 1983 from 0.5% to 3.1%. 
Furthermore, Shleifer finds that the abnormal returns began to increase gradually 
starting from 1976, as the index funds began to grow their relative ownership of the 
S&P 500. Therefore, he suggests positive relation between the abnormal returns and 
index funds ownership. This relation lays the foundation of the index effect.  
Another pioneering study by Harris and Gurel (1986) reports significant positive 
abnormal returns after the announcement of an inclusion to the S&P 500 index. 
Contrary to Shleifer’s (1986) findings, they report that the abnormal returns occur 
immediately after the announcement and fully reverse after two weeks. Harris and 
Gurel are the first to provide evidence that abnormal returns around index changes are 
likely created due to temporary shocks to the stock's demand. Furthermore, the 
temporary demand shocks are reported to be mostly caused by index funds that 
purchase included stocks and sell excluded stocks. According to the authors, at the end 
of 1983 there were 2.96% of the total market value of the S&P 500 invested in public 
index funds and possibly same portion in privately held funds. Harris and Gurel are 
the first to introduce the price pressure hypothesis as a possible explanation for the 
index effect.  
Findings of Jain (1987) and Dhillon and Johnson (1991) re-examine the earlier 
evidence and suggest new hypotheses to explain the index effect. Jain’s (1987) 
findings are consistent with previous research reporting positive (negative) average 
abnormal returns on the announcement day for S&P 500 additions (deletions). 
However, he argues against earlier evidence and claims that these effects are not due 
to excess demand caused by index funds because he discovers abnormal returns also 
for firms included to supplementary indices of S&P that are not tracked by index funds. 
As a conclusion, he suggests that the inclusion (exclusion) in the index conveys 
positive (negative) information to the market about the included firm, which gives the 
basis for the information hypothesis. Similarly, Dhillon and Johnson (1991) argue that 
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index inclusions (exclusions) provide new positive (negative) information to the 
market and posit that all the evidence they suggest supports the information 
hypothesis. Their findings show that index addition announcements in the S&P 500 
index result in increase on the prices of the firm’s stocks, bonds, and call options, while 
the firms’ put option prices decrease. They claim that the prices do not revert after the 
announcements. Thus, they interpret the announcements to be information contained.  
S&P’s policy to announce and implement index composition changes was updated in 
October 1989. Prior to 1989 the policy was to announce and carry out changes in the 
composition of the index at the same time. Since October 1989, the policy has been to 
announce changes approximately one week before the changes take place. Lynch and 
Mendenhall (1997) analyze price and volume data in the S&P 500 from 1990 to 1995 
for firms that were added to or deleted from the index. Their study was one of the first 
to provide new information to the field of research since the new policy. Despite the 
policy change, the results are consistent with earlier studies, as Lynch and Mendenhall 
document significantly positive abnormal returns on the announcement day for 
inclusions. Furthermore, they find cumulative abnormal returns on the event window 
between the announcement and effective date. However, the returns are partly reversed 
after the effective date. The findings are similar but inverted for index exclusions. 
Because the results indicate temporary price shocks likely due to high index fund 
trading, the authors suggest the price pressure hypothesis to be an explanation and 
argue strongly against the information hypothesis. Moreover, for the pre-October 1989 
data, they find different results indicating weakly positive permanent effects for 
inclusions and significantly negative permanent effects for exclusions. They argue that 
these pre-policy change results support the findings of Shleifer (1986) and agree with 
the downward-sloped demand curve hypothesis. 
Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), as well as Beneish and Whaley (1996), were amongst 
the first to provide new evidence on the index effect within the new announcement 
policy of Standard and Poor’s. Beneish and Whaley argue that the price increase 
around the index inclusions is mostly permanent and higher after the new 
announcement policy, compared to the same effects before the policy change. They 
say that the price increase is due to the index funds buying the stocks, as has been 
proposed on earlier papers. The results of both Beneish and Whaley (1996) and Lynch 
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and Mendenhall (1997) suggest that the price increase appears to take the form of a 
multiday drift (from the announcement date till the effective date), likely due to the 
index policy change. Under the new announcement policy, there are normally five 
days between the announcement and effective date. In addition to minimize the 
tracking error, index funds are buying the stocks mostly on the effective date. 
Therefore, Beneish and Whaley suggest that traders can make successful trades if they 
buy the included shares before the S&P 500 index funds (right after the announcement) 
and sell the shares after index fund demand is fulfilled (after the effective date) – what 
they call to be the S&P 500 game. However, the authors say that if more index funds 
would start to rebalance their portfolios right after the announcement, the price 
movement would happen without further delay after the announcement. Consequently, 
the price increase between the first morning after the announcement and the effective 
day might become near nonexistent and thus they expect this trading opportunity 
between announcement and effective date to disappear over time.  
Chen et al. (2004) report findings indicating permanent price increase for firms that 
are newly included to the S&P 500 index, being in line with most of the earlier 
research. However, they are likely first to report that the price response is asymmetric 
for excluded stocks, as there is no permanent price decline. Furthermore, the price 
decline after exclusions is reported to recoup over 60 days after the announcement, 
whereas the price increase after inclusions is constant over 60 days after the 
announcement. This finding questions the validity of the hypotheses suggested by 
earlier research. The study argues and provides evidence that investor awareness is 
potentially the explanation for the asymmetric effects, as awareness about a firm rises 
following an inclusion to the index but do not mitigate considerably following an 
exclusion. Due to this, Chen et al. are the first to introduce the awareness hypothesis 
as an explanation for the index effect.  
While most of the earlier evidence studies the effects in the S&P 500 index, from the 
beginning of the 21st century the research diversifies in terms of the indices under 
examination. Bechmann (2004) considers the effects of changes in the composition of 
the Danish KFX index between 1989 and 2001. He claims that KFX index uses only 
public information when making index changes. Thus, the study is conducted in an 
environment where the index effect cannot be explained by new information. The 
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results of the study report positive abnormal average returns for included stocks and 
even higher negative abnormal average returns for excluded stocks in a six-month 
period. The majority of the effects are observed prior to the changes. Furthermore, 
Bechmann reports that the effects are long-lasting, frequent, and have increased over 
time in terms of the size. Temporary price pressure around the event date is reported, 
as exclusions experience significant trading volume drop and inclusions weak increase 
in trading volume. As stated by him, these trading volume differences between index 
inclusions and exclusions can explain the asymmetry in the size of the stock price 
reactions between inclusions and exclusions found in his paper. As a conclusion, he 
argues that the downward-sloped demand curve hypothesis and liquidity hypothesis 
are probably the most accurate explanations for the effects. Furthermore, Bechmann is 
the first to introduce the selection criteria hypothesis and declares that the selection 
criterion employed by the index likely explains at least part of the effects.  
Mase (2007) investigates the effects on changes in the composition of the FTSE 100 
index. The FTSE 100 index is composed of the 100 largest companies that are listed 
in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Similar to the Nordic indices, the index 
composition changes in the FTSE 100 are based on market capitalization and should 
not provide any new information content about the fundamentals of the firms. The 
findings of the study suggest that there is temporary price pressure and movement prior 
the effective date of the index changes for both index inclusions and exclusions.  
Furthermore, the author notes that there is abnormal volume prior to the announcement 
day indicating speculation by some traders. These abnormal trading volumes occur for 
inclusions but not for exclusions. Mase (2007) concludes that the investor awareness 
hypothesis does not explain the results, as he finds that the price effects are of equal 
magnitude between the firms that are included for the first time and firms that have 
been part of the index previously but have been excluded and now are included again. 
Instead, his findings support the price pressure hypothesis, as he reports temporary 
price effects and abnormal trading volume around the events.  
Maheshwari (2015) studies the price and volume effects of inclusions in the S&P CNX 
Nifty index, which is an index endorsed by Standard and Poor’s and composed of 50 
of the biggest stocks of Indian’s National Stock Exchange. The results of the study are 
in-line with most of the research made earlier, as included stocks earn significant 
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positive abnormal returns on the inclusion day and three more days after that. CNX 
Nifty index has almost one month between the announcement and effective date. 
Regardless of the relatively long-time frame between these events, he finds significant 
positive abnormal returns also on the effective (inclusion) day. As claimed by the 
study, this can be attributed to the abnormal demand on the effective day caused by 
index funds restructuring their ownership. Furthermore, Maheshwari argues that the 
significant return effects on the effective day (after one month from the announcement 
of the event) indicate that the information hypothesis does not explain the results, as 
the returns should have been priced in fully right after the announcement day. Instead, 
the author reports evidence that supports mainly the assumptions of price pressure 
hypothesis, as he finds abnormal volume effects around both events. The findings of 
Maheshwari’s research prove evidence that the index effect exists also in emerging 
markets. 
Research on the index effect has got more diverse also in terms of the study methods 
and perspectives at the 21st century. For example, Kappou et al. (2010) study the 
overnight and tick-by-tick abnormal returns and trading volumes in the S&P 500 index 
and report trading patterns. More specifically, they posit that the effective date 
(inclusion date) abnormal returns have decreased over time and are now reflected into 
the stock prices before the effective date. This finding supports the earlier suggestions 
of Beneish and Whaley (1996) regarding the future disappearance of the profitable 
trading opportunities that were available back then by simply buying included stocks 
on the announcement day and selling them on the effective date. For excluded stocks, 
Kappou et al. indicate a price drop following the announcement (overnight effect that 
is not tradable) and further price decrease on the effective date. They also define a tick-
by-tick based trading strategy, where short and long positions are taken in the included 
companies resulting in a profit of 7% on average, transaction costs not included.  
Chen and Lin (2018) add a new dimension to earlier literature suggesting that index 
inclusion itself gives competitive advantage to firms that are added to the S&P 500 
over their non-S&P 500 included industry peers. They compare the stock performance 
of newly S&P 500 included and excluded firms to their industry competitors over the 
period of 1976 to 2011. They report results similar to earlier studies and confirm that 
newly added firms earn positive abnormal returns around the announcement. 
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Moreover, the findings of the study suggest that industry peers that are not included in 
the S&P 500 index suffer from significantly negative stock price effect at the same 
time. Chen and Lin find that following the inclusion, for example financial constraints 
and the cost of equity are significantly reduced, whereas capital investments are 
increased for the included firms. As the capital investments increase faster than those 
of the industry peers’ that are not part of the index, the included firms are also reported 
to earn more market share. Nonetheless, exclusion from the S&P 500 index is claimed 
to have negative price effects for the excluded firms. However, exclusion events do 
not have significant price effects for the peers. The authors suggest that index 
exclusions do not have significant effects on competitive advantages. The findings of 
the study are to some extent consistent with the awareness and liquidity hypotheses.  
Petajisto (2008) studies the index effect from the point of view of index funds and 
investors that aim to track the index. He claims that the index effect causes a puzzle 
from their point of view: to minimize their tracking errors, index funds must buy the 
included stocks with price premium and sell the excluded stocks without the premium. 
As the majority of the studies suggest that most of the price shift caused by the index 
changes usually occurs around the announcement date, while index funds are forced 
to balance their positions around the effective date in order to minimize their tracking 
error. Therefore, Petajisto argues that index funds happen to buy (sell) the stocks after 
majority of the price increase (decrease) effect has already occurred. Thus, index funds 
seem to end up buying high and selling low. However, for instance Kim et al. (2017) 
suggest that nowadays index funds and institutional investors seem to be rebalancing 
their portfolios earlier near the index change announcement, rather than on the 
effective date. This indicates that the dilemma introduced by Petajisto (2008) might be 
disappearing, as it seems that some of the index funds prefer buying (selling) the 
included (excluded) stocks before or at an early stage of the price shift, rather than 
track the index as perfectly as possible and overpay for the stock. Nevertheless, it 
appears relevant to consider the viewpoint of the index trackers and the possible 
changes in their behavior when making conclusions. 
Contrary to earlier research, there have been findings in recently published studies 
reporting no significant return effects around the index change events. These studies 
imply that over time, there might have occurred disappearance or change in the index 
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effect. For instance, Kim et al. (2017) find no significant abnormal returns related to 
index inclusions between 2010 and 2013 in the S&P 500 index. However, the findings 
indicate a slight price movement on the announcement day. They claim that there are 
no more profitable trading opportunities with the trading strategy of buying the stocks 
at the close on the announcement date of index inclusion and selling at the close on 
the effective date when the inclusion becomes effective, which was previously proved 
to be successful by Beneish and Whaley (1996). Kim et al. (2017) further claim that 
the index effect in general is getting smaller and will likely disappear eventually over 
time. They discuss whether professional investors are now rebalancing their portfolios 
right after the announcement date instead of waiting until the effective date. This kind 
of behavior could potentially explain their findings of price shift happening on the 
announcement date rather than price drifting positively until the effective date like it 
used to according to earlier findings (e.g. Beneish & Whaley, 1996; Lynch & 
Mendenhall, 1997).   
Additionally, Kappou (2018) supports the findings of Kim et al. (2017) by providing 
evidence that there are no abnormal return effects related to index changes in the S&P 
500 index after October 2008. The findings indicate that the index effect has changed 
dramatically after the financial crisis. According to Kappou, these significant changes 
in the effects are due to better market information by market participants. The author 
says that for example, professional investors and analysts might have become better at 
predicting the changes in advance, which could potentially reduce the magnitude of 
the effects. Furthermore, Kappou claims that these diminished returns might be caused 
by more developed algorithm trading. More developed algorithms likely take into 
account the potential price effects caused by high volumes. Therefore, the algorithms 
might be programmed to diversify the trades that they execute in a way that price 
effects are minimized. Furthermore, as the effect disappearance appears to start after 
the financial crisis, the author says that new regulation may have changed the way 
index funds and professional investors rebalance their positions and could be one 
explanation for the change in the index effect.   
Ming-Pey and Zamri (2019) study the composition changes in FBM KLCI index 
(FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index) between 2001 and 2014. 
Their findings are contradictory to most of the research papers, suggesting that index 
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inclusion events have more negative impacts on the stock prices than index exclusion 
events. Hence, excluded stocks exhibit better performance than included stocks. 
Furthermore, they posit that included stocks’ trading volume decreases. Ming-Pey and 
Zamri suggest Opinion Divergence Theory, first introduced by Miller (1977), as a 
possible explanation for their relatively different findings. In addition, they mention 
that the FBM KLCI index’s selection criterion is based on public information, and for 
that reason it is possible for investors to predict the composition changes beforehand. 
Thus, the selection criterion might explain part of their relatively contradicted findings.  
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5 DATA AND METHOD 
5.1 Data collection and description 
The purpose of this thesis is to measure the impact of index composition change events 
in the OMXH25, OMXC20, OMXC25, and OMXS30 indices. To achieve this goal, 
data on index composition changes, daily stock prices, and trading volumes of firms 
are collected. Additionally, data on the proxy indices’ daily prices are collected. The 
data are employed to perform an event study that measures abnormal returns and 
abnormal volumes around the events of interest. Furthermore, the findings are 
interpreted and compared to previous evidence of the effect, and suggested hypotheses 
are discussed. 
The data of index addition and deletion events and announcements between January 
2009 and January 2020 are collected manually from Nasdaq OMX Nordics’ news 
archive where the semi-annual reviews of the indices are published. The list of 
additions and deletions are then compared to Thomson Reuters’ “Leaver – Joiner”-list 
to check the validity of the sample. Some of the observations are deleted due to a lack 
of price data, spin-offs, or mergers and acquisitions. The final sample consists of 80 
observations, of which 43 are addition events and 37 deletion events. The distribution 
of the events over time is displayed in Figure 1. Additional information about the 
inclusion and exclusion events can be found from appendices 1,2,3, and 4. Daily price 
and trading volume data as well as number of current shares outstanding are collected 
from Bloomberg for each stock in the sample and for reference indices OMX Helsinki 
PI, OMX Stockholm PI, and OMX Copenhagen PI.  
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Figure 1. Events by year 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the observations between the Nordic indices and the 
type of event (additions and deletions). The table illustrates the fact that most of the 
total events (68 %) occurred in the Danish indices, and thus the overall sample is quite 
heavily governed by OMXC20 and OMXC25. Therefore, it is relevant to perform the 
event study also separately for all the indices to identify possible issues related to this.3 
Moreover, OMXS30 and OMXH25 have relatively few index change events despite 
the fact that they consist of more companies (55) than OMXC20 and OMXC25 indices 
(45). This is likely due to differences in selection criteria: OMXS30 and OMXH25 
make constitution changes based only on trading volume, whereas OMXC20 and 
OMXC25 use trading volume and market capitalization.  
 
                                                 
3 Because the overall sample is heavily governed by the events occurred in the OMXC20 and OMXC25, 
the overall sample results could be affected in a way that the results represent the situation in the two 
governing indices, while the results in the OMXH25 and OMXS30 could differentiate. Therefore, the 
overall sample results might not be a truthful description of the index effect in all four Nordic indices, 
if this possible problem would not be taken into account.  
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Table 2. Observations 
  OMXH25  OMXS30  OMXC20  OMXC25  All 
                
Additions  9  6  18  10  43 
Proportion  21 %  14 %  42 %  23 %  100 % 
            
Deletions  6  5  18  8  37 
Proportion  16 %  14 %  49 %  22 %  100 % 
           
Total events  15   11   36   18   80 
Proportion  19 %  14 %  45 %  23 %  100 % 
 
5.2 Methodology 
Event study methodology is used to measure the stock market effects. Event study 
methodology is commonly implemented to examine the impact of a specific event on 
the stock price or trading volume of a firm. The method is widely employed for 
examining market reactions to a variety of events in the research of accounting, 
finance, and economics. Additionally, the method is highly applied in research on the 
index effect. The idea in event studies is to determine whether abnormal returns or 
volumes are associated with an announcement or an event. The representation of the 
event study methodology is more specifically introduced in the following subsections. 
In subsections 5.2.2 – 5.2.5, descriptions and formulas of the method are based on a 
study by MacKinlay (1997).   
5.2.1 Events of interest 
Press releases announcing the changes on the index compositions in the Nordic indices 
are published before the market opens at 08:30:00 CEST. Therefore, any effect of the 
announcement should be visible the same day. The effective date, when the addition 
or/and deletion takes place, is released in the press release. Moreover, on the 
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announced effective date, the index change becomes effective when the market opens. 
Consequently, the announcement date (AD) is defined as the press releases’ date of 
publication, and the effective date (ED) as the date when the index change takes place. 
The time period between the AD and ED in the sample is approximately 11 to 16 
trading days.  
5.2.2 Estimation period and event windows 
The event window is the time period in which the effect of the price or volume changes 
of the firms is studied (MacKinlay, 1997). In this thesis, two events are identified and 
studied separately. The first event is the announcement of index inclusion (exclusion), 
and the second event is the inclusion (exclusion) becoming effective. The event 
windows and estimation window employed in this thesis are illustrated in Figure 2. To 
examine the short-term effects, the event window periods of -1 to +1 and -5 to +5 days 
around the announcement dates (AD) and effective dates (ED) are used. To capture 
the long-term effects, event windows starting from 20 and 50 days before the AD until 
the day 0, and event windows starting from the ED and ending 20 and 50 days later 
are employed. The event windows that take place after the ED allows us to investigate 
whether the price effects are permanent or temporary. The event windows prior the 
AD make it possible to capture potential pre-event effects.  
The estimation window represents the time-frame when the parameters of the expected 
returns are estimated. MacKinlay (1997) suggests an estimation period from 90 days 
up to 250 days and says that estimation window and event windows should not overlap. 
In this thesis, an estimation period of 120 days is chosen. The estimation window starts 
180 days prior the events and ends 60 days prior the events, to avoid overlapping with 
the event windows (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Estimation window and event windows 
5.2.3 Measuring normal returns 
Normal return represents a stock’s theoretical or expected return without the event 
occurring. Abnormal return (AR) is the component of actual return that is not predicted 
by the market movement alone. More specifically, abnormal return is the return 
difference (positive or negative) between a stock’s actual return and normal return. For 
stock i and event date t, abnormal return, 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is the difference between the stock’s 
actual return 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, and the expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡) at time t: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡)    (1) 
where 𝑋𝑡 represents the conditioning information at time t. To calculate abnormal 
returns, the normal return must be modeled. There are three popular ways for modeling 
the normal return: 1) the constant mean return model, 2) the market model, and 3) the 
adjusted market model. 
The first option, constant mean return model, assumes that the normal return for stock 
i can be calculated simply by computing the mean return from the past returns of the 
stock: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
37 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  0)    𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜀𝑖𝑡)  =  𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on stock i at time t, µ𝑖 is the mean return for the stock i, and 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the disturbance term for security i at time t (with expectation of 0 and variance 
of 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 ). Notably, the constant mean return model appears to not be commonly applied 
in studies of the index effect. This might be due to the fact that the market model can 
be easily applied in this context.  
The second option, the market model, is commonly employed in studies of the index 
effect (see e.g. Harris & Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Jain, 1987; Dhillon & Johnson, 
1991; Mase, 2007; Chen & Lin, 2018). The market model is a statistical one factor 
model. As stated by the model, the return for any chosen stock is conditional on the 
return of the market portfolio. As stated by the market model, each stock’s normal 
return can be determined with the following formula: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (3) 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  0)    𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜀𝑖𝑡)  =  𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return for stock i at time t, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market’s return at time t. 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic zero mean disturbance term for the stock i.  𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, and 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  are 
the estimated parameters in the model.  
Market-adjusted return model is the third frequently utilized method in the literature 
on the index effect (see e.g. Beneish & Whaley, 1996; Lynch & Mendenhall, 1997; 
Wurgler & Zhuravskaya, 2002; Chen et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2017; Kappou, 2018). 
When calculating the abnormal returns 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, with the market-adjusted return model, 
the 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is simply the difference between the stock’s observed actual return 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 
the market’s return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑚,𝑡    (4) 
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Market-adjusted return model is restricted because of the constraints (illustrated in 
Formula 3) of 𝛼𝑖 being 0 and 𝛽𝑖 being 1. Therefore, the market-adjusted return model 
asserts that the normal return is just the return of the market. Because of this restriction 
of the model, MacKinlay (1997) suggests that the market-adjusted return model should 
only be used when no other model can be easily applied. This is due to the restrictions, 
as they might lead to biases. As specified by him, the model might be useful, for 
example, when pre-event estimation period is not possible to obtain (e.g. when 
studying initial public offerings).  
Other types of statistical models could also be employed for modeling the normal 
return. For instance, multifactor models are quite widely used in the literature on 
finance. These multifactor models often incorporate multiple factors (e.g. 
macroeconomic or fundamental factors) in addition to the market factor. However, 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, p. 155-156) argue that the benefits from using 
these more complicated multifactor models are limited in event studies. This is due to 
the fact, that multiple factors that are incorporated in these models have often only a 
slight explanatory significance beyond the market factor. Therefore, multifactor 
models are not utilized or further examined in this thesis.  
When the three simple models that were introduced are compared, it can be noted that 
the market model is potentially more precise than the two other models. Campbell et 
al. (1997) point out that compared to the constant mean return model, the market model 
reduces the part of return that is caused by the variation in the market’s return, resulting 
in reduction of variance of the abnormal return. Moreover, as MacKinlay (1997) 
argued, the market-adjusted return model is restricted and should only be applied when 
no other models can be easily used. Hence, the market model is chosen to model the 
normal return in this thesis, as it is potentially the most accurate among the three 
options.  
MacKinlay (1997) suggests that a broad stock index should be chosen as a proxy for 
market index when the market model is applied. For the Nordic indices, broad and 
widely used index for all shares listed in the Nordics do not exist. Therefore, the 
following OMX all-share indices are chosen as a proxy for the respective countries’ 
stocks; OMX Helsinki PI, OMX Stockholm PI, and OMX Copenhagen PI. These three 
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all-share indices are value weighted indices of all listed shares in each respective 
country. This means that separate indices are used as a proxy for Finnish, Swedish, 
and Danish stocks to minimize the potential bias caused by unsuitable proxies.  
5.2.4 Measuring abnormal returns   
As expressed earlier in Formula 1, the abnormal return is simply the return difference 
between the stock’s actual and normal return. Theoretically, if no new events occur, 
the abnormal return for a stock should be zero. The formula for estimating abnormal 
returns when the market model is applied to measure the normal return is: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  −  𝛼𝑖  − 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡   (5) 
where abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) are calculated for each security i for each day t in the 
event window, and the parameters 𝛼𝑖, and 𝛽𝑖 are estimated by the market model 
(Formula 3) over the estimation window.  
As the market model is applied, the conditional variance of abnormal returns is defined 
as: 
𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  +  
1
𝐿
[1 +
(𝑅𝑚,𝑡+𝜇𝑚)
2
?̂?𝑚
2 ]   (6) 
where L represents the length of the estimation window. When L gets large, the second 
term moves towards zero and the conditional variance of AR can be approximated by 
the first term (the squared standard error). Hence, choosing a long estimation window 
makes estimating the variance of AR less problematic, as it can be then assumed that 
the second term of the variance is simply zero.  
As the aim of this thesis is to determine whether index composition changes affect the 
stock prices, the daily average abnormal returns (AAR) for the stocks in the event 
window are calculated. The formula for calculating the stocks’ average abnormal 
return 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 for period t is defined as: 
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𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1      (7) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡’s are the abnormal returns for each event period and N represent the 
number of events.  
When the length of the estimation window (L) is large, the variance for 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 is: 
𝜎2(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1      (8) 
Using these formulas, the abnormal returns for the events can be calculated and used 
for further analysis.  
5.2.5 Measuring cumulative abnormal returns  
The observations of abnormal returns are collected and accumulated to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the event of interest. Moreover, the CAR across the event 
window 𝑡1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡2, for an asset i can be defined as the sum of the included ARs: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
    (9) 
As the length of the estimation window becomes longer, the variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is given 
by the following formula: 
𝜎2(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = (𝑡2 − 𝑡1 + 1) 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2                       (10) 
The average abnormal returns (AARs) can be further utilized and accumulated over 
the event window 𝑡1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡2 using the following formula of cumulative average 
abnormal returns 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                     (11) 
The variance of CAAR over any specified period is as follows: 
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𝜎2𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝜎
2(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                     (12) 
The CAARs are computed in order to analyze whether the returns are abnormal during 
specified periods. 
5.2.6 Measuring abnormal trading volumes 
The main difference between an abnormal volume event study and an abnormal return 
event study is that instead of returns, the log-transformed relative volume per firm is 
used (Campbell & Wasley, 1996). This relative volume is simply the percentage of 
shares traded in relation to the total number of shares outstanding at time t. In the 
formula, a constant of 0.000255 is added to avoid taking the logarithm of zero, in case 
if there are days with zero trading. The formula for the daily trading volume is 
therefore (Campbell & Wesley, 1996): 
𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 0.000255
𝑆𝑖𝑡
 ∙ 100)                     (13)  
where 𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the number of shares outstanding at time t for stock i, and 𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the 
observed trading volume for the stock at time t. Furthermore, in this thesis the mean-
adjusted abnormal trading volume method is the chosen approach to estimate abnormal 
trading volumes (Campbell & Wesley, 1996): 
𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖                       (14)  
where ?̅?𝑖 is the average trading volume for stock i and is given by the following 
formula: 
?̅?𝑖 =  
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑡=1
𝑡=𝑓(𝑙)                        (15)  
where T is the number of days in the estimation period, and f(l) is the first (last) day 
of the estimation period. To obtain similar conditions with the abnormal return 
calculations, the estimation period starts 180 days prior the events and ends 60 days 
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prior the events, to avoid overlapping with the event windows. Like the average 
abnormal return formula, the average abnormal volume (AAV) is given by: 
𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1                         (16) 
where 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡’s are obtained from formula 14 for each event period and N represent the 
number of events. Furthermore, like cumulative abnormal returns, the cumulative 
abnormal volume can be defined for an asset i during event window 𝑡1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡2 as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑉𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                       (17) 
Average abnormal volumes (AAVs) can be further accumulated over the event 
window 𝑡1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡2 with the formula of: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                     (18) 
5.2.7 Measuring the statistical significance 
It is important to test whether the estimated abnormal returns and volumes are 
statistically different from zero or not. To make conclusions about the statistical 
significance, the null hypothesis for testing the significance of abnormality is set. The 
null hypothesis states that the event has no impact on returns or trading volumes. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis assumes that the abnormal returns and abnormal average 
returns for stocks around the events are zero. Similarly, for the volume event study, 
the null hypothesis assumes the abnormal volumes and abnormal average volumes for 
stocks to be zero around the events. There are several test statistics that can be used to 
measure the statistical significance of the results, and whether the null hypothesis is 
rejected or not. Generally, these significance tests can be grouped into parametric and 
nonparametric tests. Parametric tests assume that an individual firm's abnormal returns 
or volumes are normally distributed, whereas nonparametric tests do not make such 
assumptions. Parametric tests are grounded on the widely known method called the t-
test. Later on, scholars have developed variations from the t-test to correct for the t-
test's prediction error. 
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Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) state that there are problems related to the 
commonly applied methods for measuring the statistical significance (e.g. t-tests, Chi-
Square, sign test). They argue that the problems are caused by the variance occurred 
due to the event and therefore the common methods tend to reject the null hypothesis 
too frequently and incorrectly. Hence, Boehmer et al. (1991) propose a modified 
standardized cross-sectional method, called BMP-test. The BMP-test is robust to the 
variance induced by the event. Subsequently, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) found that 
the BMP-test ignores cross-sectional correlation of the returns and thus over-rejects 
the null hypothesis. That is why they propose a modification to the BMP-test to 
account for the cross-sectional correlation. The modification is called adjusted BMP-
test and is robust to both issues related to the standard t-test: variance changes and 
cross-correlation. In this thesis, the adjusted BMP-test proposed by Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010) is applied to evaluate the significance of the abnormal returns while 
the t-test is used for the abnormal volumes.  
5.2.8 Possible challenges in event studies 
There are challenges associated with event studies. The most probable ones are 
considered when conducting the event study in this thesis. First, one possible challenge 
is other major events that might have occurred on the event windows and influenced 
the stock prices or trading volumes. However, this challenge was considered and 
observations where the deletion events occurred due to mergers, acquisitions, spin-
offs, or other similar reasons were removed from the sample. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that all events that might have had an effect on the stocks are not completely 
left out. For instance, earnings reports or profit warnings are not considered. 
Second, most of the events in the full sample occurred in two of the indices (mainly in 
the OMXC20 and OMXC25), while other two indices (OMXS30 and OMXH25) had 
relatively few events. Hence, it is possible that some of the indices where most of the 
events occurred would govern the full sample. Thus, it is possible that the full sample 
would not give a comprehensive picture of the index effect in the Nordics. To avoid 
this, the event study is conducted and evaluated also separately for all the indices. 
Moreover, the event study that is performed separately for the four indices might 
induce a challenge regarding the OMXS30 and OMXH25, caused by the relatively 
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small sample sizes in the two indices. Due to this, the samples might have outliers that 
affect considerably the results of the specific indices. 
Third, different results might have been observed if the proxy indices for estimating 
the model parameters would have been different. For example, if some major index 
such as STOXX 600 would have been chosen, the betas might have been different 
altering the market model returns and then the abnormal returns of the study. One 
could argue that applying one index as a proxy for the sample could be preferable to 
using each country’s all-share indices. However, stocks that are part of the OMXH25, 
OMXS30, OMXC25, and OMXC20 indices are also part of the respective countries’ 
all-share indices. Yet, most of these stocks are not part of for instance, the STOXX 
600 index. Therefore, one could argue that it is reasonable to choose the respective 
countries all share indices as a proxy. 
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter introduces and discusses the findings of this thesis. An evaluation is made 
based on the share price and trading volume responses to index inclusions and 
exclusions of companies listed in the Nordic indices OMXH25, OMXS30, OMXC25, 
and OMXC20. Moreover, the reactions are examined through average abnormal 
returns and cumulative average abnormal returns of the stocks on index change 
announcements, and later, the changes becoming effective. To attain a comprehensive 
view of the index effect in the Nordics, the average abnormal volumes and cumulative 
average abnormal volumes are also evaluated around the events. The short-term 
findings are presented first, after which the long-term findings are introduced. The 
findings are shortly discussed and compared to previous evidence. 
6.1 Full sample results 
Table 3 presents the average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) around the short-term event windows and the relative 
adjusted BMP-test statistics. The results of Table 3 display the full sample consisting 
of all events that occurred in the four Nordic indices between January 2009 and 
January 2020. AD and ED refers to announcement and effective date, respectively.  
Results presented in Table 3 indicate no distinct patterns of abnormal returns occurring 
around any of the four events. On most event days, the abnormal returns are generally 
small and statistically insignificant. Despite of no clear return patterns, occasional days 
with statistically significant abnormal returns are observed, suggesting temporary 
price shocks around the events. However, the observed abnormal returns are rather 
conflicting between each other and no straightforward conclusion about the effect can 
be made.  
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Table 3. Abnormal returns around the short-term event windows 
  Additions     Deletions 
  Event days AAR Adjusted BMP     Event days AAR Adjusted BMP 
AD 
-5 0.08% 0.209   
AD 
-5 0.01% -0.443 
-4 -0.01% -0.475   -4 0.46% 2.538** 
-3 0.50% 2.101**   -3 0.08% -1.404 
-2 0.18% 0.570   -2 -0.34% -0.461 
-1 0.24% 0.981   -1 0.13% 0.869 
0 0.04% -0.146   0 0.21% -0.274 
+1 -0.38% -1.156   +1 -0.66% -3.067*** 
+2 0.14% 0.081   +2 -0.28% -0.061 
+3 -0.59% -2.090**   +3 -0.23% 0.953 
+4 -0.35% -0.409   +4 0.51% 0.943 
+5 -0.28% -0.903   +5 0.55% 1.761* 
 CAAR    CAAR  
-1 ; +1 -0.10% -0.748   -1 ; +1 -0.32% -1.214 
-5 ; +5 -0.43% -0.460   -5 ; +5 0.45% -0.059 
  Event days AAR Adjusted BMP     Event days AAR Adjusted BMP 
ED 
-5 -0.36% -1.546   
ED 
-5 0.46% -0.164 
-4 0.13% 0.253   -4 0.21% 0.512 
-3 -0.03% -1.105   -3 -0.19% -0.292 
-2 0.04% 0.010   -2 -0.51% -1.609 
-1 0.09% 0.735   -1 0.91% 2.334** 
0 0.16% 1.492   0 0.37% 1.055 
+1 0.25% 1.054   +1 -0.24% -0.548 
+2 0.33% 0.998   +2 0.25% 1.098 
+3 -0.85% -1.287   +3 -0.16% -1.625 
+4 0.01% 0.792   +4 -0.04% -0.154 
+5 0.04% -0.107   +5 -0.20% -0.332 
 CAAR    CAAR  
-1 ; +1 0.50% 2.284**   -1 ; +1 1.04% 1.835* 
-5 ; +5 -0.19% 0.307   -5 ; +5 0.85% 0.100 
-1; +1 =Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) of 3-day event window around the event date.  
 -5; +5 = Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) of 11-day event window around the event date. 
* = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level and *** = significance at the 1% level. 
More specifically, Table 3 shows that around index deletions the announcement of 
exclusion results in a significantly negative share price response on the day after the 
announcement. This suggests that the announcement of index deletion is likely taken 
as negative news. On the contrary, after the announcement of index addition no 
positive returns are observed. Moreover, on the announcement day of additions there 
occurs nearly zero abnormal return indicating no surprise or new information being 
published on that day. Therefore, it is possible that the information about the addition 
is already incorporated into the stock price before the announcement day, or that the 
announcement of the information does not simply affect the stock price. Moreover, 
prior to the announcements of index deletions and additions, significant positive 
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abnormal returns occur on days -4 and -3, respectively. This one-day positive pre-
announcement return effect prior both announcements could suggest some anticipatory 
trading. Therefore, next the long-term effects are observed before the announcement 
day to make further conclusions whether observable anticipatory trading occurs or not. 
Overall, straightforward conclusions about the announcement effects cannot be made. 
This is due to the return effects being rather conflicting. For instance, announcement 
of index deletion leads to negative returns, but announcement of additions has no 
return effects. Additionally, positive returns occur before both events. Furthermore, no 
multi-day price drifts are found around the announcements. For these reasons, we 
conclude that the price effects around index change announcements are rather 
negligible.  
For effective dates, Table 3 shows no distinct return patterns. When index additions 
become effective, only the cumulative average abnormal return during the three day 
event window (-1;+1) implies significantly positive abnormal returns around the 
effective date. This indicates that some abnormal trading around the effective date 
potentially occurs that results in positive stock price drift during the three-day event 
window. Symmetrically for index deletions, positive cumulative average abnormal 
return occurs during the three day event window (-1;+1) as well as positive AAR on 
day -1. However, the one-day return effects around effective dates are mainly small 
and statistically insignificant, and thus no return patterns can be discovered. Therefore, 
no straightforward conclusions should be drawn on the effective date effects either.  
In contrast to the results of this thesis, for example Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) find 
significant positive (negative) price effects on the announcement day in the S&P 500. 
However, findings of Kappou et al. (2010) suggest that all abnormal returns are 
generated right after the announcement of index changes. Whereas, Bechmann (2004) 
claims that his results do not imply clear overall stock price effects around the 
announcement date, but instead around the effective date. The results of this thesis 
around the short-term event windows show index deletions generating negative one-
day abnormal returns right after the announcement, which is in line with the findings 
of Kappou et al. (2010). Additions face positive one-day AAR before the 
announcement that tends to revert and turns into one-day negative AAR after the 
announcement, which is in line with the findings of Mase (2007) but contradicts the 
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suggestions of Kappou et al. (2010). Furthermore, somewhat similarly to Bechmann’s 
(2004) findings, both index additions and deletions generate positive cumulative 
average abnormal returns around the effective date. Overall, the short-term findings 
indicate no distinct return patterns around the events despite a few days with abnormal 
price movement. Next, it seems relevant to assess whether the few observed daily price 
movements around the events are temporary shocks or does the price drift for a longer 
time period. This can be done by analyzing the long-term return effects around index 
changes.  
Figure 3 illustrates cumulative average abnormal returns from 30 days prior to the 
announcement day until 10 days after the announcement. For deletions, the CAAR 
increases well before the announcement. However, on the announcement date (day 0), 
the CAAR experience a negative drop that lasts for the next three days, supporting the 
finding of the short-term negative price shock after the AD for deletions. For additions, 
the CAAR is relatively stable throughout the event window. Furthermore, the returns 
are not increasing before the announcement of additions, suggesting that no 
anticipatory trading occurs beforehand. Additionally, the findings shown in the figure 
are against the selection criteria hypothesis. This is because the hypothesis claims that 
decreasing market value is often a reason for index deletions (as it is one of the two 
selection criteria in the OMXC indices) but instead, the figure shows that the market 
values have increased before the announcement for deletions. However, it is possible 
that the market value has decreased before the 30 days that are observed in the event 
window, which have led to index deletion or that the trading volumes (being the other 
selection criterion) have been decreasing.  
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Figure 3. CAAR around the announcement date -30 to 10 
Figure 4 shows CAARs around the effective date (from 10 days prior until 30 days 
after). For both additions and deletions, a slightly positive price pressure around the 
effective date can be observed which was also found in Table 3. After the effective 
date the CAAR of additions seem to have a downward multiday price drift and vice 
versa. 
 
Figure 4. CAAR around the effective date -10 to 30 
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To give a more detailed description of the results, Table 4 shows the long-term 
cumulative average abnormal returns and relative adjusted BMP statistics for the 
sample both before and after the events during five different event windows. More 
specifically, the table illustrates the long-term effects by assessing the cumulative 
average abnormal returns from 50 days before the announcement day until 50 days 
after the events become effective. This allows us to capture both long-term pre-
announcement effects and post-effective date effects. The event window of 10 days 
before the effective date until the ED allows us to capture the price effects between the 
announcement and effective dates.  
Table 4. Cumulative average abnormal returns around the long-term event windows 
 Additions Deletions 
CAAR [AD: -50 ; 0] -2.40% 9.90% 
Adjusted BMP  -1.549 1.515 
CAAR [AD: -20 ; 0] -0.47% 4.20% 
Adjusted BMP  -0.573 1.346 
CAAR [ED: -10 ; 0] -0.63% 1.22% 
Adjusted BMP  -0.535 0.196 
CAAR [ED: 0 ; +20] -1.34% 3.12% 
Adjusted BMP  1.380 0.715 
CAAR [ED: 0 ; +50] -4.72% 8.77% 
Adjusted BMP  -1.346 1.955* 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level   
** Statistically significant at the 5% level  
* Statistically significant at the 10% level  
The long-term cumulative average abnormal returns are mainly insignificant as only 
the event window starting from the effective date to 50 days ahead has significantly 
positive CAAR. Therefore, we argue that index inclusions as well as exclusions do not 
have permanent price effects. The long-term results do not to support the findings of 
many studies arguing that inclusions (exclusions) are followed by price increases 
(decreases) that are persistent over time (see e.g. Shleifer, 1986; Bechmann, 2004). In 
fact, the long-term results indicate that the occasional price movements that occurred 
in the short-term tend to revert quickly and not last over a longer period. These long-
term results are mostly in line with the findings of Harris and Gurel (1986), because 
the occasional short-term abnormal returns seem not to last over a longer-period. 
Results of Beneish and Whaley (1996) as well as Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) 
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suggest that in the S&P 500 the prices seem to take the form of a multiday positive 
(negative) drift from the announcement date of index additions (deletions) till the 
effective date. This finding is contradictory to the results of this thesis as the CAARs 
observed in the event window starting from day -10 to ED are insignificant for both 
additions and deletions, suggesting no price drift between the announcement day and 
effective day in the Nordic indices. Kappou (2018) finds similar results suggesting that 
for the first time there exist no abnormal return opportunities between announcement 
and effective date in the S&P 500 in data obtained after October 2008. 
In general, the occasional short-term price effects observed are mostly consistent with 
the price-pressure hypothesis, because the price effects are temporary shocks possibly 
caused by abnormal trading volumes. For example, Harris and Gurel (1986), and 
Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), conclude similarly in the S&P 500 index and claim 
that prices revert after the index change events. Moreover, Harris and Gurel (1986) 
argue that index changes do not imply any new information to the public because the 
price effects are only short-term shocks and revert in the long-term – which appears to 
be the case in this thesis as well. The temporary price shocks observed in the thesis are 
best explained by temporary excess demand and supply occurring around the events 
(price pressure). However, in order to make further implications whether there actually 
occurs excess demand and supply, the abnormal volumes around the events are 
examined in section 6.3.  
In contrast to earlier evidence, Kappou et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2017) suggest that 
in recent years, stock prices have found their equilibrium prices faster after an index 
change events. This implication is partly consistent with this research because only 
occasional price movements are observed. The overall results of this thesis are 
conflicted with the majority of earlier studies, as most of the earlier evidence suggests 
that the index effect evidently exists in the S&P 500 index and measurable short- and 
long-term abnormal returns are found. The price reactions observed in this research 
are relatively small and indicate that the index effect has only a minor effect on prices 
of stocks listed in the Nordic indices. Moreover, the index changes seem not to provide 
any new information to market participants in the Nordics, and it can be therefore 
concluded that the findings are not contradictory to the efficient market hypothesis.  
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Petajisto (2008) claims that higher transparency of index selection criteria is related to 
a lesser extent of the index effect, because the index composition changes could be 
predicted by market participants. This higher transparency in the Nordic indices could 
be one explanation for the relatively small price reactions. It is also possible that the 
effect has been more remarkable before January 2009 and has been diminishing during 
recent years, which is suggested to be happening in the S&P 500 index (e.g. Kappou 
et al., 2010; Kappou, 2018; Kim et al., 2017). 
6.2 Results of separate indices 
To further analyze the return effects, the sample is separated into individual indices, 
and event study is performed. This allows us to detect whether the effects are similar 
through all the Nordic indices and further analyze if some of the four indices govern 
the overall sample results (if the overall sample returns are strongly affected by one or 
two of the four indices). Table 5 shows the long-term and short-term return effects of 
the composition changes in the four indices.  
In Table 5, addition and deletion events are separated, and cumulative average 
abnormal returns of the four Nordic indices are reported. The CAARs are evaluated 
from 30 days before the index change announcements until the announcement to 
capture potential pre-event effects. The immediate stock price reactions are captured 
with three-day event windows around the announcement day and effective day. To 
evaluate whether the effects are temporary or permanent, the CAARs are also 
evaluated on an event window starting from the effective date and ending 30 days later. 
 
 
 
  
53 
Table 5. Cumulative average abnormal returns on different Nordic indices 
Additions 
 OMXH25 OMXS30 OMXC25 OMXC20 
CAAR [AD: -30 ; 0] -0.89% 17.29% -1.72% -4.28% 
Adjusted BMP  -0.079 2.634*** -0.548 -2.007** 
CAAR [AD: -1 ; +1] -0.25% -1.50 % -0.07% 0.44% 
Adjusted BMP  -0.504 -0.078 -0.798 0.042 
CAAR [ED: -1 ; +1] 0.68% 0.32% 1.30% 0.22% 
Adjusted BMP  0.788 1.303 2.047** 0.672 
CAAR [ED: 0 ; +30] -0.82% -8.86% 0.47% -4.29% 
Adjusted BMP  0.543 -0.442 -0.188 -1.632 
Deletions 
 OMXH25 OMXS30 OMXC25 OMXC20 
CAAR [AD: -30 ; 0] 3.53% 12.81% 1.06% 4.46% 
Adjusted BMP  -0.879 1.037 0.706 1.486 
CAAR [AD: -1 ; +1] -0.33% -0.55% 0.08% -0.45% 
Adjusted BMP  -1.584 -1.237 -0.120 -0.787 
CAAR [ED: -1 ; +1] 0.50% 2.79% 0.71% 0.97% 
Adjusted BMP  0.181 1.720* 0.636 1.108 
CAAR [ED: 0 ; +30] 5.06% 13.09% -0.73% 4.64% 
Adjusted BMP  0.926 1.494 0.172 0.672 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level    
** Statistically significant at the 5% level    
* Statistically significant at the 10% level    
The immediate effects around AD and ED illustrated in Table 5 are mainly similar 
between the different indices and generally insignificant. Significantly positive 
CAARs are observed only for OMXC25 additions and OMXS30 deletions in short-
term event windows around the ED. In the long-term, returns of OMXS30 seem to 
differentiate from the other indices, as significantly positive CAAR occurs prior to the 
addition announcement. However, it must be noted that the sample size is extremely 
small in the OMXS30 (5 observations), which undermines the internal and external 
validity of the results regarding the OMXS30. Furthermore, OMXC20 exhibits a 
significantly negative abnormal return on the event window prior the announcement 
of index addition.  
Nevertheless, the return effects for separate indices are mainly insignificant. 
Furthermore, the price reactions are mainly similar between the four indices. This 
finding verifies that there is no single index governing the overall sample results, 
which would make the full sample results distorted. 
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6.3 Abnormal volume results 
To provide further insight into the index effect in the Nordics, the average abnormal 
volumes around the events are measured and examined. First, abnormal volumes are 
observed in the short-term around the events and then in the long-term. The short-term 
average abnormal volumes (AAVs) are illustrated in Table 6 for all of the four events. 
The table also shows the long-term cumulative average abnormal volumes (CAAVs) 
within two different event windows of 30 days before the announcement date until 10 
days after, as well as 10 days prior to the effective date until 30 days after. 
Table 6. Average abnormal volumes around the events 
  Additions     Deletions 
  
Event days AAV t-test   
  
Event 
days 
AAV t-test 
AD 
-5 18.41% 0.336   
AD 
-5 1.48% 0.032 
-4 11.50% 0.216   -4 2.92% 0.036 
-3 -5.28% -0.082   -3 19.92% 0.383 
-2 -0.62% 0.043   -2 8.76% 0.198 
-1 11.73% 0.236   -1 7.94% 0.198 
0 12.70% 0.259   0 7.34% 0.184 
+1 -8.29% -0.085   +1 3.46% 0.076 
+2 2.23% 0.041   +2 15.47% 0.312 
+3 -2.16% -0.031   +3 1.00% 0.033 
+4 -8.37% -0.093   +4 8.84% 0.156 
+5 8.44% 0.195   +5 3.16% 0.065 
    CAAV t-test       CAAV t-test 
  -30 ; +10 809.88% 2.322**     -30 ; +10 -139.12% -0.071 
  
Event days AAV t-test   
  
Event 
days 
AAV t-test 
ED 
-5 -15.56% -0.266   
ED 
-5 4.93% 0.123 
-4 -4.38% -0.049   -4 13.50% 0.305 
-3 -0.57% 0.020   -3 24.84% 0.559 
-2 72.31% 1.354*   -2 74.00% 1.525* 
-1 17.31% 0.300   -1 8.09% 0.170 
0 -0.09% 0.000   0 -2.85% -0.024 
+1 -0.58% 0.016   +1 -15.58% -0.250 
+2 4.56% 0.069   +2 -14.32% -0.235 
+3 -10.09% -0.188   +3 -20.70% -0.380 
+4 -22.79% -0.399   +4 -37.79% -0.690 
+5 -22.64% -0.347   +5 -30.24% -0.530 
    CAAV t-test       CAAV t-test 
  -10 ; +30 289.87% 1.643*     -10 ; +30 -600.91% -1.901** 
* = significance at the 10% level, 
** = significance at the 5% level 
*** = significance at the 1% level.       
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Table 6 shows that no significant average abnormal volumes are found around the 
announcement days in the short-term. Therefore, in the short-term it seems that no 
anticipatory trading is made before the announcement day, as well as that index change 
announcements do not lead to any abnormal trading. However, around the effective 
days, a significant peak in trading volumes occurs two days before the index changes 
become effective in both additions and deletions.  
The result of significant trading volume before the effective date is similar to the 
findings of Bechmann (2004), who reports that the majority of the abnormal volume 
in the KFX index occurs one day prior to the effective date. Bechmann (2004) further 
concludes that this abnormal volume before the effective date provides evidence 
indicating that some investors are adjusting their portfolios in accordance with the 
index changes. Similarly, Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) report that the largest 
abnormal volumes take place on the day before the index additions become effective 
and claim that to be caused by index funds buying the added stocks to minimize their 
tracking error. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the significant trading 
volumes occurring two days prior to the effective dates for additions and deletions in 
the Nordic indices are likely caused by investors and index funds aiming to adjust their 
portfolios in accordance with the index changes.  
To draw further conclusions of the trading volume changes, the long-term volume 
effects are observed. Therefore, the cumulative average abnormal volumes (CAAVs) 
are calculated for two event periods: 30 days prior to the announcement of index 
changes to 10 days after, and 10 days before the effective day to 30 days after. The 
results of these event window CAAVs are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 and more 
specifically in Table 6.  
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Figure 5. CAAV around the announcement date -30 to 10 
Figure 5 shows the CAAVs around the announcement day for both additions and 
deletions. CAAV of index additions increase linearly throughout the whole event 
period indicating that investors are trading highly with the included stocks prior to and 
right after the announcement of index inclusion. This long-term pre-announcement 
CAAV is also statistically significant for additions as can be seen in Table 6. However, 
the CAAV of deletions remains relatively stable, and no significant changes in trading 
volumes are observed during this event period. This result of index additions being 
more heavily traded before the effective date than index deletions is consistent with 
the findings of Bechmann (2004). Additionally, this high pre-announcement CAAV 
of index additions indicates that some anticipatory trading occurs starting from 30 days 
before the announcement. Furthermore, this pre-announcement trading volume 
increase might have something to do with the selection criteria of the Nordic indices, 
as trading volume is one of the factors used for deciding new index constituents. 
Therefore, it is possible that the high trading volume that takes place have actually 
caused the inclusion, and not vice versa. Thus, the selection criteria hypothesis 
potentially explains a part of the results. 
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Figure 6. CAAV around the effective date -10 to 30 
Figure 6 illustrates the long-term volume effects of the additions and deletions around 
the effective date. Around both events an increase in cumulative average abnormal 
volume occurs two days prior to the effective date, which was also identified earlier in 
Table 6. Moreover, for additions, the volume stays relatively high for the whole event 
period, suggesting that a somewhat permanent increase in trading volume occurs. This 
is supported by the fact that the CAAV during the event window is significantly 
positive as shown in Table 6. On the contrary, for deletions the volume decreases after 
the effective day and the event window CAAV is significantly negative (Table 6).  
Similar results regarding the abnormal volumes have been observed in earlier studies. 
For instance, Hegde and McDermott (2003) find in-line behavior in trading volumes 
around the effective date for index additions. They report that the trading volume starts 
to increase four days prior to the effective date, reaching its peak on the effective date. 
Furthermore, they say that the abnormal volume remains high after the effective date 
for index additions, suggesting that increased liquidity could potentially be the 
explanation for such effects. Additionally, Kappou et al. (2008) find permanent 
volume increases, supporting the liquidity hypothesis. In addition, Harris and Gurel 
(1986) suggest that inclusion to the S&P 500 index increases the stocks’ volume 
permanently and further claim that this is due to funds (not limited to index funds) 
being more willing to trade with the stocks when they are a part of the index.  
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The results shown in Figure 6 and Table 6 provide evidence for potentially improved 
(reduced) liquidity for stocks added (deleted) to (from) the Nordic indices, as the 
results show signs of a somewhat permanent trading volume increase for additions and 
decrease for deletions. This finding supports the liquidity hypothesis. To draw further 
conclusions about the role of the liquidity hypothesis in the Nordics, the market 
microstructure4 of the Nordic indices should be studied. The market microstructure in 
terms of the index effect is studied on the S&P 500 index, for example by Chen et al. 
(2004), but there is no such research made on the Nordic indices. Therefore, future 
research regarding the market microstructure in the Nordic indices could provide 
interesting findings.  
In addition, the significant short-term abnormal volumes observed prior to the effective 
dates in Table 6 support the price pressure hypothesis. As the price pressure hypothesis 
was also the most appropriate explanation for the occasional price movements 
observed, it seems to best explain the overall findings of this paper. However, 
especially the price movements do not imply distinct return patterns around index 
changes and thus, it must be concluded that the role of the index effect in the Nordic 
indices is rather negligible but observable.  
                                                 
4 Market microstructure is a branch of finance that focuses on the details of how exchange occurs in 
stock markets. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
Stock market indices are occasionally revised in accordance with the methodology that 
the index applies. These revisions lead to occasional deletions of one or more 
participant companies from the index and consequently to inclusions of a new 
company or companies to the index. Contradictory with the efficient market 
hypothesis, scholars have discovered that these index inclusions and exclusions tend 
to affect the stock prices resulting in inclusions exhibiting positive abnormal returns 
while deletions leading to negative abnormal returns. This stock market anomaly is 
called the index effect. The purpose of this thesis was to examine whether the index 
effect exists in the Nordic indices and to what extent. This was accomplished by 
analyzing the abnormal return and volume effects around the index composition 
change events. In order to draw conclusions of the possible hypotheses that could 
explain the results, the longevity of the return and volume effects as well as the 
symmetry in the effects between deletions and additions was to be measured.  
The findings of the thesis suggest that the index effect is evident in the Nordic indices. 
However, the effect is rather negligible since no distinct abnormal return patterns are 
discovered around the index revision events. Instead, abnormal returns on individual 
days around the events are observed. However, these returns are rather conflicting 
between each other and thus, straightforward conclusions based on these are not drew. 
More specifically, around the effective date of index additions and deletions, positive 
cumulative average abnormal returns are observed as well as significant abnormal 
trading volume two days prior to the effective date for both additions and deletions. 
This short-term finding suggests heavy trading by index funds and investors before the 
changes come into effect. Furthermore, the volume effects are found to be somewhat 
permanent and symmetric between included and excluded stocks, indicating improved 
(impaired) liquidity for stocks that are included (excluded) to (from) the Nordic 
indices. Moreover, abnormal trading volume increases from one month prior to the 
announcement of index additions. This pre-announcement trading volume increase for 
index additions can be explained by anticipatory trading or selection criteria 
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hypothesis5. Despite the long-term abnormal trading volume occurrence, no long-term 
return effects are found. This gives support to the efficient market hypothesis since 
stock prices are relatively unaffected by the significant abnormal trading volumes. To 
generalize the findings, we conclude that the index effect has a relatively small impact 
on the returns but distinct impacts on the trading volumes of the stocks in the Nordic 
indices.  
The findings of the thesis are best explained by the price pressure and liquidity 
hypotheses, because temporary price movements and somewhat permanent abnormal 
trading volume increases, and decreases are observed. Moreover, the findings do not 
reject the selection criteria hypothesis which likely explains the results to some degree. 
Additionally, the relatively small price reactions might be attributed to the Nordic 
indices having explicit selection criterion transparency. The findings of the thesis are 
contradictory to most of the research that shows evidence of both long-term and short-
term positive (negative) abnormal returns on index addition (deletion) events. 
However, findings regarding the abnormal volumes in this thesis are similar to the 
majority of earlier studies. Overall, the results of this thesis mostly agree with the 
implications of the more recently conducted studies, claiming that the index effect 
might have changed or diminished over the years. Moreover, the index changes seem 
not to provide new information to market participants in the Nordics, and thus, the 
findings are not contradictory to the efficient market hypothesis. 
While most of the literature regarding the index effect is conducted on the S&P 500 or 
other major indices, the results of this thesis provided new insights into the 
phenomenon by studying the effects in the Nordic indices. Moreover, the Nordic 
indices provide an information free setting to study the index effect. This information 
free setting results from the selection criteria that are used in the Nordic indices, as the 
selection criterion is publicly specified and accessible for everyone, containing only 
market capitalization and trading volume. Because the index change decisions are 
                                                 
5 The trading volume is part of the selection criteria in the Nordic indices and, therefore, it is possible 
that the trading volume has been increasing for some other reason prior the announcement day, that 
have actually caused the inclusion, and not vice versa. Thus, the selection criteria hypothesis could 
explain the finding. 
61 
conducted based on these publicly available criteria, index inclusions and exclusions 
in the Nordic indices should not provide any new information to the market 
participants. For many other indices, including the S&P 500 index, the criterion is 
nonspecific and not completely based on public information. Additionally, in the S&P 
500 index, most of the deletions are caused by company events (e.g. M&A activities, 
spin-offs, or bankruptcies) leaving only a few pure deletions. This makes it difficult to 
compare deletion events to addition events. In turn, in the Nordic indices, most of the 
deletions are put into practice based on the selection criteria methodology, much like 
the additions. Therefore, addition and deletion events are comparable in the Nordics. 
The thesis considers most of the potential biases. Thus, the results are reliable. The 
findings provide valuable information for all investors but especially for index funds 
and index trackers. For the Nasdaq Nordics, the results show evidence that the index 
revision methodology is effective, as no indications of an anomaly regarding the index 
changes are observed. For investors, the results imply that no notable abnormal return 
opportunities exist in the Nordic indices around the index change events. For the index 
effect’s field of research, the thesis exhibits evidence that the index effect is relatively 
small in the Nordic indices where the index changes are information free events.  
It would be essential to find out why the index effect is relatively small in the Nordics 
and whether it has diminished over time or not. Therefore, reasons behind the 
relatively small effects in the Nordic indices could be one subsequent question for the 
future research to solve. In addition, analyzing the market microstructure of the Nordic 
indices would be interesting from the index effect’s point of view. It would likely tell 
whether the liquidity hypothesis plays a more crucial role in explaining the index effect 
in the Nordics.  
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Appendix 1. List of inclusions and exclusions of OMXH 25 
  INCLUSIONS EXCLUSIONS 
Dates Announcement Effective  Announcement Effective 
2009-07-20     
Metsä Board 
Corporation B   
2009-08-03       
Metsä Board 
Corporation B 
2010-01-14 Kemira Oyj       
2010-02-01   Kemira Oyj     
2011-07-13     Tieto Oyj (TIE1V)   
2011-08-01       Tieto Oyj (TIE1V) 
2013-01-10 
Huhtamäki Oyj 
(HUH1V)   
Sanoma Oyj 
(SAA1V)   
2013-02-01   
Huhtamäki Oyj 
(HUH1V)   Sanoma Oyj (SAA1V) 
2014-07-08 
Valmet 
Corporation       
2014-08-01   
Valmet 
Corporation     
2015-01-09 
Tieto 
Corporation       
2015-02-02   Tieto Corporation     
2016-07-07 
Metsä Board 
Corporation B   Kemira Oyj   
2016-08-01   
Metsä Board 
Corporation B   Kemira Oyj 
2018-07-05 
DNA 
Plc (DNA)    
Tieto 
Corporation (TIETO)   
2018-08-01   DNA Plc (DNA)    
Tieto 
Corporation (TIETO) 
2019-07-08 
Tieto 
Corporation 
(TIETO)   
YIT Corporation 
(YIT)   
2019-07-08 
Kemira Oyj 
(KEMIRA)       
2019-08-01   
Tieto Corporation 
(TIETO)   YIT Corporation (YIT) 
2019-08-01   
Kemira Oyj 
(KEMIRA)     
2020-01-10 
Kojamo 
Plc (KOJAMO)       
2020-02-03   
Kojamo 
Plc (KOJAMO)     
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Appendix 2. List of inclusions and exclusions of OMXS 30 
  INCLUSIONS EXCLUSIONS 
Dates Announcement Effective  Announcement Effective 
2009-06-03 
Modern Times 
Group MTG AB  Eniro AB    
2009-06-03 Getinge AB      
2009-07-01  Getinge AB   Eniro AB  
2009-07-01  
Modern Times 
Group MTG AB     
2014-06-05 
Kinnevik, 
Investment AB ser. 
B      
2014-07-01  
Kinnevik, 
Investment AB 
ser. B     
2015-12-04 
Fingerprint Cards AB 
 ser. B (FING B) 
Modern Times Group  
MTG AB ser. B  
2016-01-04  
Fingerprint 
Cards AB ser. B 
(FING B)   
Modern Times Group 
MTG AB ser. B 
2016-12-07 
Autoliv Inc. SDB 
(ALIV SDB)  
Nokia Corporation  
(NOKIA SEK) 
2017-01-02  
Autoliv Inc. 
SDB (ALIV 
SDB)   
Nokia Corporation 
(NOKIA SEK) 
2017-12-07   
Lundin Petroleum 
AB (LUPE)   
2018-01-02     
Lundin Petroleum AB 
(LUPE) 
2018-06-07 
Hexagon AB ser. B 
(HEXA B)  
Fingerprint Cards AB 
 ser. B (FING B) 
2018-07-02   
Hexagon AB 
ser. B (HEXA 
B)   
Fingerprint Cards AB 
ser. B (FING B) 
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Appendix 3. List of inclusions and exclusions of OMXC 25 
  INCLUSIONS EXCLUSIONS 
Dates Announcement Effective  Announcement Effective 
2017-06-09 
Bavarian Nordic A/S 
(BAVA)    NKT A/S (NKT)   
2017-06-09 Sydbank A/S (SYDB)  
Topdanmark A/S 
(TOP)   
2017-06-19  
Bavarian Nordic 
A/S (BAVA)   NKT A/S (NKT) 
2017-06-19  
Sydbank A/S 
(SYDB)  
Topdanmark A/S 
(TOP) 
2017-12-05 NKT (NKT)  Sydbank (SYDB)   
2017-12-18  NKT (NKT)  Sydbank (SYDB) 
2018-06-07 Ambu B (AMBU B)  NKT (NKT)   
2018-06-07 
Royal Unibrew 
(RBREW)     
2018-06-07 SimCorp (SIM)     
2018-06-18  
Ambu B (AMBU 
B)  NKT (NKT) 
2018-06-18  
Royal Unibrew 
(RBREW)    
2018-06-18  SimCorp (SIM)    
2018-12-07 
Rockwool 
International B 
(ROCK B)   
Nordea Bank Abp 
(NDA DK)   
2018-12-07 Sydbank (SYDB)  
Bavarian Nordic 
(BAVA)   
2018-12-27  
Rockwool 
International B 
(ROCK B)   
Nordea Bank Abp 
(NDA DK) 
2018-12-27  Sydbank (SYDB)  
Bavarian Nordic 
(BAVA) 
2019-06-11 
The Drilling Company 
 of 1972 A (DRLCO) Sydbank (SYDB)   
2019-06-24  
The Drilling Company 
 of 1972 A (DRLCO) Sydbank (SYDB) 
2019-12-10 
Topdanmark A/S 
(TOP)   
The Drilling Company  
of 1972 A 
2019-12-23   
Topdanmark A/S 
(TOP)    
The Drilling 
Company of 1972 A 
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Appendix 4. List of inclusions and exclusions of OMXC 20 
  INCLUSIONS EXCLUSIONS 
Dates Announcement Effective  Announcement Effective 
2009-12-02 Jyske Bank A/S  Coloplast B   
2009-12-21  Jyske Bank A/S  Coloplast B 
2010-06-03 Coloplast B  Genmab   
2010-06-21  Coloplast B  Genmab 
2010-12-02 Pandora A/S  Lundbeck   
2010-12-02 GN Store Nord  Jyske Bank A/S   
2010-12-02 
Chr. Hansen 
Holding A/S  D/S Norden   
2010-12-20  Pandora A/S  Lundbeck 
2010-12-20  GN Store Nord  Jyske Bank A/S 
2010-12-20  
Chr. Hansen 
Holding A/S  D/S Norden 
2011-06-06   
A.P. Møller Maersk 
A   
2011-06-06 D/S Norden  Nordea Bank AB   
2011-06-06 Lundbeck     
2011-06-20    A.P. Møller Maersk A 
2011-06-20  D/S Norden  Nordea Bank AB 
2011-06-20  Lundbeck    
2011-12-05 Nordea Bank AB  D/S Norden   
2011-12-05 
A.P. Møller - 
Mærsk A  Pandora A/S   
2011-12-19  
A.P. Møller - 
Mærsk A  D/S Norden 
2011-12-19  Nordea Bank AB  Pandora A/S 
2012-06-04 Pandora A/S  Sydbank   
2012-06-18  Pandora A/S  Sydbank 
2012-12-06 Jyske Bank A/S  NKT Holding   
2012-12-27  Jyske Bank A/S  NKT Holding 
2013-12-05 
Genmab A/S 
(GEN)   
H. Lundbeck A/S 
(LUN)    
2013-12-23  
Genmab A/S 
(GEN)   
H. Lundbeck A/S 
(LUN)  
2014-06-04 ISS A/S (ISS)  
Topdanmark A/S 
(TOP)   
2014-06-23  ISS A/S (ISS)  
Topdanmark A/S 
(TOP) 
2016-06-10 
H. Lundbeck A/S 
(LUN   Tryg A/S (TRYG)    
2016-06-20  
H. Lundbeck A/S 
(LUN   Tryg A/S (TRYG)  
2016-12-07 Nets A/S (NETS)  
FLSmidth & Co. 
(FLS)   
2016-12-07 
DONG Energy 
A/S (DENERG)  
Nordea Bank AB 
(NDA DKK)   
2016-12-19  Nets A/S (NETS)  
FLSmidth & Co. 
(FLS) 
2016-12-19  
DONG Energy 
A/S (DENERG)  
Nordea Bank AB 
(NDA DKK) 
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2017-06-09 
FLSmidth & Co. 
(FLS)   Nets A/S (NETS)   
2017-06-09 
Nordea Bank AB 
(NDA DKK)   William Demant Holding (WDH) 
2017-06-19  
FLSmidth & Co. 
(FLS)   Nets A/S (NETS) 
2017-06-19   
Nordea Bank AB 
(NDA DKK)    
William Demant 
Holding (WDH) 
 
